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DANGER AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS:
PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
IN A POST-DA UBERT WORLD
Erica Beecher-Monas*
Edgar Garcia-Rill, Ph.D.**
INTRODUCTION
For nearly twenty years we have known that psychiatrists
cannot predict whether a person who has committed a violent act
will be violent in the future.' Neither can lay people.' The very
best anyone can do is speculate. Even the most scientific
predictions based on thorough examination, diagnosis of mental
symptoms, past patterns of behavior, and probabilistic assessment
are wrong nearly as often as they are right.3 The most common
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H.
Bowen School of Law; J.S.D. Columbia University School of Law, J.D. University of
Miami School of Law; M.S. (Anatomy) University of Miami. Many thanks to J. Thomas
Sullivan. Thanks also to Amy Dunn for her able and enthusiastic research assistance.
** Director, Center for Translational Neuroscience, Professor of Anatomy and
Neurobiology University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Ph.D. McGill University
(Montreal), postdoctoral training U.C.L.A.
See generally CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL., THE VIOLENCE PREDICTION
SCHEME: ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS IN HIGH RISK MEN (1994) (detailing studies
demonstrating the inaccuracy of violence risk predictions).
2 See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND
MANAGING RISK 62 (1998) (noting that "laypersons and the clinicians had few differences
of opinion" about assessments of dangerousness, and that neither had much accuracy).
3 See, e.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others,
269 JAMA 1007, 1010 (1993) (concluding that "clinicians are relatively inaccurate
predictors of violence"). In this study, when clinicians divided institutionalized men into
two groups, "violent" and "nonviolent," and examined their behavior more than three
years later, 53% of the "violent" group had committed acts of violence, as opposed to 36%
of the "nonviolent" group. See id. at 1007. Random predictions would have a sensitivity
and specificity of 50%. See id. at 1009. Thus, while the results are better than chance, the
low sensitivity and specificity of the predictions show "substantial room for improvement."
Id. Sensitivity is the percentage of times that a test correctly gives a positive result when
the individual tested actually has the characteristic in question. See Bruce R. Parker &
Anthony F. Vittoria, Debunking Junk Science: Techniques for Effective Use of
Biostatistics, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 33, 34 (1999). Specificity is the percentage of times a test
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courtroom predictions-frequently based solely on hypotheticals
-are wrong twice as often as they are right.4  Nevertheless,
legislatures and courts continue to demand expert risk
assessments.' Experts routinely testify in courtrooms across the
country that their scientific expertise gives them enough insight to
be able to predict "with reasonable medical certainty" that a
capital defendant will commit future acts of violence, and
therefore merits the death penalty.6
These experts are allowed to testify because, as a
constitutional matter, all that is required is a floor of reliability and
relevance.' Evidentiary rules do not generally apply at sentencing
hearings.8 The floor of relevance and reliability in the context of
correctly reports that a person does not have the characteristic under investigation. See id.
Actuarial studies, though more accurate than clinical predictions, still predict with less
than stellar accuracy: when scores on the most accurate of the actuarial instruments, the
VRAG, "were dichotomized into 'high' and 'low' risk groups, the results indicated that
55% of the 'high scoring' subjects committed violent recidivism, compared with 19% of
the 'low scoring' group." John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment. Scientific Validity and
Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 908 (2000); see also infra Part
IV.B.2.c (discussing the VRAG).
4 See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 1 (1981) (surveying the major studies of clinical prediction of
future dangerousness and finding that psychiatrists had about a one in three chance of
predicting future dangerousness correctly).
5 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 17 (decrying the legal and political pressures
on experts to make violence risk assessments in the face of their inherent inaccuracy).
6 Future dangerousness predictions are also used in psychiatric commitment
proceedings, parol determinations, sexual predator determinations, bail decisions, and a
variety of other legal settings. See id. at 17-21 & n.1 (noting the variety of settings in which
future dangerousness predictions are demanded of mental health experts and observing
that "[c]ourts and legislatures impute powers to psychiatry and the related professions
which by and large they do not possess"). Because "death is different" and the stakes are
considerably higher, this Article limits its discussion to the context of capital sentencing
testimony, although the scientific validity analysis is equally applicable to these other
settings.
7 Even the American Psychiatric Association acknowledged that the unreliability of
clinical predictions of dangerousness is an "established fact." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 920 (1983). The wholesale professional condemnation of the reliability of this type of
testimony failed to move a majority of the Supreme Court, however, either in Barefoot or
in subsequent cases.
8 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (Repl. 1994) (providing that "[a]ny evidence which
has probative value and is relevant to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence"); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2001) ("In resolving any dispute
concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence
applicable at trial .... "). Hearsay, for example, is frequently admissible in sentencing
hearings. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 151 (1949); Todd v. Schomig, No.
98-428-GPM, 2002 WL 392988, at *8 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2002). So is testimony about
unadjudicated prior offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2001);
Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Nonetheless, both hearsay and
unadjudicated offenses must have "indicia of reliability" and relevance to be admissible
even at sentencing hearings. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (finding
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science however, is that the testimony reflect valid science. What
goes into assessing whether testimony reflects valid science has
been addressed in the context of evidentiary rules by the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,9 and its
progeny. Although those decisions are evidentiary rather than
constitutional, the floor of relevance and reliability is of even
greater importance in the constitutional setting. Thus, the Daubert
requirement of scientific validity is based on sound logic and ought
to be applied to the constitutional issue of whether the expert
testimony makes the trial so unfair that it violates due process."°
An astrologer, for example, would not be permitted to testify
about future dangerousness, either as a constitutional matter or
under rules of evidence, because the testimony would be
misleading. Actually, it would be no more misleading than
permitting medical experts to testify about future danger, since lay
people can predict future dangerousness as well as medical
experts.1 A trial fraught with error espoused by experts can
hardly be fair and certainly would not be helpful to the jury. 2
Although the testimony of clinicians about future dangerousness
offers little more than that of an astrologer, such clinical testimony
is pervasive, and courts persist in circumventing any inquiry into
the scientific validity of expert future dangerousness predictions.
This is an important concern because giving the imprimatur of
science to chicanery undermines our justice system. Because of
this concern, researchers undertook a series of studies in order to
improve the accuracy of such predictions.
Nonetheless, courts persist in circumventing any inquiry into
the scientific validity of expert future dangerousness predictions.
This is a concern because when a court permits the imprimatur of
evidence presented at sentencing hearing that convicted murderer was a member of the
Aryan Brotherhood irrelevant); United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 1995) (to
be admissible at sentencing, hearsay must have some other corroboration).
9 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert requires that expert testimony in federal courts meet
minimum standards of reliability. Id.
10 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring the state to provide
the defense with any exculpatory evidence it possesses on reliability grounds, "not [as]
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but [as] avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused").
11 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 62 (noting that "laypersons and the clinicians had few
differences of opinion" about assessments of dangerousness). Indeed, the expert future
dangerousness testimony in Barefoot was found to be reliable because lay witnesses were
permitted to testify as to future dangerousness and lay witnesses could do no better. See
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
12 See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 299 (1997) (arguing that although Daubert sets an
evidentiary standard, and Barefoot sets a constitutional standard, the reliability focus of
Daubert should inform the constitutional minimum of Barefoot).
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science to be given to chicanery, justice becomes a mockery.
Because of this concern, a series of studies was undertaken by
researchers in order to improve the accuracy of such predictions. 3
Their goal was to develop an empirically based actuarial
instrument that would reflect a state of the art understanding of
the factors correlated with violence and their inter-relationships. 4
This Article will examine the scientific validity of this approach.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I will discuss the use
of future dangerousness evidence in capital sentencing hearings
and the applicable constitutional standard articulated in the
Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot v. Estelle." Part II will
outline the current standards for admissibility of expert testimony
in the context of capital sentencing hearings, address the tension
between the Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy of cases 6 and
Barefoot, and discuss the currents of unease beginning to stir the
courts, concluding that the reliability standards of Daubert should
indeed apply to expert testimony on future dangerousness.
In Part III, this Article will explore the latest scientific
research about brain structure and function, and its implications
for predicting future dangerousness, and make some suggestions
about how this research could be used to aid the factfinder faced
with having to make a life or death decision. Part III will also
address risk analysis as a new paradigm for assessing future
dangerousness and discuss the development and use of actuarial
instruments in making such assessments. In Part IV, this Article
will analyze the validity of actuarial instruments currently used to
assess the risk of future violence, and will explore whether
actuarial-based expert testimony can aid a jury's sentencing
decision. Part V discusses the prediction of dangerousness in light
of cognitive psychology, suggesting that testimony about actuarial
instruments may help the jury resolve a key question. This Article
concludes that although actuarial instruments should be used with
caution, they offer improvements over the unaided judgment of
juries and over the kind of unscientific assertions about future
13 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at xi, xii (describing the genesis and goals of the
violence risk assessment guide).
14 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 190; WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at xii.
15 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (permitting experts to testify about future dangerousness as a
constitutional matter).
16 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the scope of the
Daubert inquiry to technical as well as scientific evidence); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1.997) (reiterating the trial judge's mandate to review testimony for scientific
validity and "fit"); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (instructing
the federal judiciary to make admissibility determinations based on analyzing the scientific
validity of the proffered testimony, and on whether the testimony "fits" the issues in the
case).
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dangerousness currently typical in capital sentencing proceedings.
I. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS TESTIMONY IN THE COURTS
A. State Courts and Future Dangerousness Evidence
In capital sentencing hearings, future dangerousness may
become an issue in a number of ways. It may be introduced as an
aggravating circumstance, either statutory17 or non-statutory.18 It
may be introduced by the prosecution through proffered expert
testimony, cross-examination of a defense expert, or through the
prosecutor's argument. 9 Because the capital sentencing statutes of
some states list absence of future dangerousness as a mitigating
circumstance," the defense may also introduce future
dangerousness testimony through an expert, through character
witnesses, or simply through argument."
A number of states, such as California and Florida, have
common law prohibitions against the prosecution introducing
expert testimony on the issue of future dangerousness.22 This can
put the defense between a rock and a hard place however, because
if the defense offers any expert testimony regarding mental health
(either as part of an insanity defense or as a mitigating factor at
sentencing), that may be seen as "opening the door" to future
dangerousness testimony by prosecution experts. For example, in
17 Future dangerousness is a statutory aggravating factor in six states: Idaho,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)
(Michie Supp. 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150(b) (1999); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b) (West Supp. 2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (LEXIS Repl. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(e) (West
2001).
18 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 708 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1999); State v. Hughes, 521 S.E.2d
500 (S.C. 1999).
19 See, e.g., Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (upholding
admissibility of expert testimony as to defendant's future dangerousness).
20 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4)(k) (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(c)(8)
(LEXIS Supp. 2001); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (Supp. 2000).
21 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 477 A.2d 611 (N.J. 1984) (per curium) (upholding trial
court's admission of sociologist's expert opinion on defendant's potential for
rehabilitation).
2 See People v. Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1, 64 (Cal. 1994); Haliburton v. Dep't Corr., 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
23 See Ex parte Brewer, 50 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The court stated
that:
Presenting expert psychiatric and psychological evidence could be a 'double
edged sword' in that negative information about Applicant could be exposed
and exploited by the prosecution. Possibly the jury would consider such
evidence adversely to Applicant in answering the 'future danger' punishment
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Ruiz v. Norris,24 although future dangerousness is not an
aggravating factor under Arkansas law, an Arkansas federal
district court held that prosecution expert testimony concerning
the defendants' future dangerousness was admissible because the
defendants had proffered their own expert to testify that they had
"mellowed" with age.25 Therefore, even where it is not a statutory
aggravating factor, future dangerousness testimony has a way of
creeping into evidence.
Even without expert predictions, the prosecution may attempt
to demonstrate future dangerousness by showing that the
defendant has a past history of violent crime.26 Although a pattern
of previous violence is one of the strongest predictors of future
violence, the problem with sentencing a defendant based on
unadjudicated conduct is that the evidence of such conduct is often
flimsy at best. Indeed, some courts are beginning to show concern
about the reliability issues implicated in admitting evidence of
unadjudicated crimes. For example, in considering the
constitutional implications of admitting evidence of prior
unadjudicated offenses in order to prove future dangerousness, the
Eastern District of Virginia acknowledged a heightened reliability
standard for capital sentencing and recognized that, although it is
not bound to observe the rules of evidence regarding admissibility,
the court should not permit "an evidentiary free-for-all that
undermines reliability."27 As a result, the court required a hearing
outside the presence of the jury to determine the reliability of the
evidence of the unadjudicated prior offenses. A similar approach
to expert testimony-a Daubert-like hearing outside the presence
of the jury to determine scientific validity of the expert
testimony-is similarly necessary to meet constitutional demands
for relevance and reliability of future violence predictions.
special issue.
Id.
24 868 F. Supp. 1471 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
25 Id. at 1532. Although the court acknowledged that the prosecution's expert was not
testifying in rebuttal, because the defendants' expert had not testified to their lack of
dangerousness, it nonetheless felt that the defendants had opened the door to future
dangerousness testimony. See id.
26 See, e.g., Gilliard v. Scroggy, 847 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that statutory
aggravating factor allowing jury to consider past convictions for violent offenses
"implicitly" posed future dangerousness inquiry).
27 United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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B. Barefoot and the Constitutionality of Future
Dangerousness Testimony
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence since
Furman v. Georgia28 has focused on balancing consistency in
decisionmaking with individual fairness.29 The Supreme Court set
the minimal standard for imposing the death penalty as "the
evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences
under law."30  According to the Supreme Court, the jury's
"reasoned moral response" to the evidence and arguments at
sentencing must be supported by information sufficient and
relevant for reliable rational decisionmaking 1 Moreover, in Gregg
v. Georgia,32 the Court warned that "accurate sentencing
information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of
people who may never before have made a sentencing decision."33
Under each of these precepts, using scientifically flawed
information appears to be impermissible.
Nevertheless, in Barefoot v. Estelle,34 the Supreme Court
upheld expert testimony about future dangerousness that even the
majority acknowledged was completely unsupported by scientific
evidence. At issue was the constitutionality of permitting
psychiatrists to testify about the defendant's future behavior, given
that such predictions are wrong two out of three times. Reliability,
then as now, was the touchstone for admissibility of evidence at
sentencing.35 Before the Court was an amicus brief by the
American Psychiatric Association explaining that no one
(including psychiatrists) can predict with any degree of reliability
that an individual will commit other crimes in the future.36
At the sentencing proceeding in Barefoot, two psychiatrists
28 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating then-current death penalty statutes as
unconstitutionally arbitrary).
29 See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of
Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 1251, 1251-52
(2000).
30 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
31 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
32 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
33 Id. at 190.
34 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
35 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring)
(noting that "the cardinal concern of the rules of admissibility for expert testimony-
reliability.., is also the paramount concern in addressing the constitutionality of capital
sentencing procedures").
36 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
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testified that the defendant "would probably commit further acts
of violence and represent a continuing threat to society."37 They
did not base their opinions on any personal examination of the
defendant, nor upon any history of past violent behavior (the
defendant had prior convictions for drug offenses and unlawful
possession of firearms and had escaped from jail where he was
being held on charges of statutory rape, but had no history of
violent crime). Instead, the experts based their testimony on a
hypothetical question based on the crime and the defendant's
conduct.38 The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of such
testimony, remarking that disallowing it would be like
"disinvent[ing] the wheel."39  Because courts had traditionally
admitted such testimony, the Court refused to overturn its
precedent. The Court acknowledged the American Psychiatric
Association's opposition to future dangerousness testimony due to
the extreme unreliability of such evidence. Nonetheless, it found
that because the Association did not claim that psychiatrists were
always wrong with respect to future dangerousness predictions-
only that they were wrong more often than not-it would not
exclude such testimony, since the testimony comported with the
state's rules of evidence. 0
The issue in Barefoot was constitutional: Could the state
sentence a defendant to death based on scientifically questionable
testimony? The Supreme Court decided that it could, because the
state's evidentiary rules permitted such testimony. The Supreme
Court distinguished its decision in Barefoot from scientific
evidence cases in which testimony about future dangerousness had
been disallowed by explaining that Barefoot sought a
constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert testimony.4"
The Court was "not persuaded that such testimony is almost
entirely unreliable," and so found that the adversary system would
be competent to take account of its shortcomings.42 As a result,
the Court found "no constitutional barrier to applying the ordinary
37 Id. at 884.
38 The prosecutor's hypothetical asked the psychiatrists to assume a number of facts
(taken from the testimony at trial): conviction for five nonviolent criminal offenses; arrests
for sexual offenses against children; a bad reputation in the eight communities the
defendant had lived in over ten years; unemployment during the two months preceding
the crime; drug use; boasting of plans to commit crimes to acquaintances; shooting a police
officer without provocation from a distance of six inches; and acting as though there were
nothing unusual after the crime. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric
Association at 5, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
39 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
4) See id. at 904.
41 See id. at 899.
42 Id.
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rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony. '43  The
ordinary rules of evidence have changed, however,n" and these
changes have illuminated the extreme unreliability and irrelevance
of expert testimony that has no empirical foundation
masquerading as science.
II. DAUBERT AND EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF VIOLENCE
A. The Daubert Trilogy
The Supreme Court has altered dramatically what counts as
scientific knowledge in courts of law through a trilogy of cases
addressing scientific evidence. In this transformative series of
cases, the Supreme Court has demanded that judges examine the
empirical basis for statements made by experts in federal courts.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,45 the Supreme
Court laid the groundwork for this transformation by requiring
district court judges to evaluate the scientific validity and "fit" of
expert testimony. The objective of the Daubert analysis is to
ensure the reliability and relevance of expert testimony and to be
certain that an expert employs the same professional standards of
intellectual rigor in the courtroom as is expected in the practice of
the relevant field.46 The standard of relevance and reliability in the
context of scientific testimony now requires scientific validity. 7
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner," the Court reiterated the
Daubert standards, expounded on its notion of "fit," and explained
43 Id. at 904.
44 See id. at 898 (noting that "the rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and
state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its
weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and
contrary evidence by the opposing party"). Post-Daubert, the rules of evidence require
judges to act as gatekeepers to ensure that only scientifically valid expert testimony be
admitted.
45 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
46 See Paul C. Gianelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2001-03 (1994).
47 See id. at 2021 (observing that "Daubert required a higher standard of admissibility
for money damages than Barefoot required for the death penalty"). Although the
argument has been made that Daubert is not technically inconsistent with Barefoot
because Daubert involved interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence while Barefoot
involved interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, nearly everyone
acknowledges the tension between the two decisions. See, e.g., Craig J. Albert,
Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived from Panel Data, 60
U. Prrr. L. REv. 321, 338 (1999) (asserting that "it goes too far to say simply that Daubert
impliedly overruled Barefoot[,]" but acknowledging that "they cannot co-exist as a matter
of common sense").
48 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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that methodology and expert conclusions are not entirely distinct
inquiries: The validity of expert conclusions depends on the
soundness of the methodology. Finally, in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael,9 the Court explained that not only do judges have to
evaluate the scientific validity of testimony based on the
traditional "hard" sciences, but that they must also evaluate the
validity of expert testimony based on what are often referred to as
the "soft" sciences, such as psychology.50 Technical or other
specialized knowledge must similarly meet a standard of
evidentiary reliability.51 Thus, Daubert's general principles apply
to all expert testimony.52
Although directed at federal district court judges, these
decisions have affected state courts also. For example, even in
states that have eschewed the Daubert standard in favor of the old
general acceptance standard, courts are responding to the pressure
to rationalize their decisions by insisting that expert testimony
meet standards of scientific validity. 3 Thus, even where the
Supreme Court's standard is not followed-that is, in many state
courts-there is an increased awareness that whatever evidence is
considered should be based on a sound empirical foundation.
The rationale underlying the Daubert trilogy's gatekeeping
requirement is that the expert's opinion must have a reliable basis
in order to be relevant.54 Unreliable testimony cannot assist the
jury, and assisting the factfinder is the only reason for admitting
expert testimony. Daubert set out a framework for evaluation.
First, a federal trial judge faced with a proffer of scientific
testimony must determine whether the expert's testimony is
"scientific knowledge" that will assist the factfinder to determine a
fact in issue. To qualify as scientific knowledge, the Supreme
Court held, "an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method."56 Astrology is therefore out. Four "general
observations" guide the inquiry into scientific validity:57
49 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
50 Engineering testimony was at issue in Kumho Tire. Id. at 137.
51 See id. at 141. Although the Court explicitly based its rationale on the language of
Rule 702 of the Federal of Rules of Evidence, finding it makes no distinction between
"scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized knowledge," the dichotomy
that many of the district courts were drawing between "soft" and "hard" science made
little sense.
52 See id. at 148.
53 See, e.g., Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1997)
(reviewing experts testimony under Frye standard and addressing scientific validity).
54 See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147.
55 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
56 Id. at 590.
57 Id. at 593.
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testability; peer review and publication; the existence of
methodological standards, including the error rate of the
methodology; and general acceptance. 8 The overall goal of these
"flexible"59 guidelines" is to evaluate expert testimony by the
standards scientists themselves use to critique their work.6'
These standards have had a dramatic impact. One by one,
experts are successfully challenging juror (and judge)
misconceptions. Take, for example, eyewitness testimony, long
believed to be the epitome of reliable evidence. It turns out that
the more positive an eyewitness is about the correctness of the
identification, the less likely the identification is to be correct.6"
More courts are admitting such expert testimony to dispel the
myth that certainty of identification is any indication of its
reliability.62 The movement toward increased empiricism in the
courts has the potential to finally dispatch outdated notions about
human behavior. It also has the potential to inform and revitalize
the justice portion of the criminal justice system.63
Radical transformations are never painless, and this one has
met with its share of resistance. Many judges continue, even after
Daubert, to circumvent scientific analysis, relying instead on rules
of thumb and other short-cuts.64 This is especially true in criminal
cases, where-with the prominent exception of DNA evidence-
there has often been little if any empirical support for the
assertions of experts.6  As a result, it is common for expert
58 See id. at 593-94.
59 See id. at 594.
60 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
61 See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 58 (2001).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132 (D.N.J. 1996).
63 The law's moral authority, an important means of modifying human behavior,
depends on the strength of its assumptions about human nature. See Owen D. Jones, Law
and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 167, 170 (1997) (explaining that in order to successfully modify human behavior in
appropriate directions, "law needs a model that integrates the social sciences (upon which
it currently and heavily relies) with the life sciences" and that "the success of every legal
system necessarily depends, in part, on the solidity-that is, the accuracy and the
predictive power-of the behavioral model on which it rests").
61 See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 72-73 (1998).
65 For example, the F.B.I. was forced to acknowledge that the dearth of empirical
support for its traditional hair analysis techniques made hair identification using such
techniques untrustworthy. The F.B.I.'s "white paper commentary" on microscopic hair
analysis asserts that the "microscopic characteristics of hair can assist the examiner in
determining the racial origin, body area and whether disease, damage or artificial
treatment is present." Douglas Deedrick, FBI Responds to Questions Raised About Hair
Comparison Analysis, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 27. Although these
characteristics may be "useful," the F.B.I. recognizes that hair comparisons do not
constitute a basis for personal identification. See id. Microscopic hair comparisons now
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testimony in a toxic tort case (where the stakes are economic) to
face far greater scrutiny than testimony in a criminal case (where
liberty and life itself are often at stake). Expert future
dangerousness testimony, proffered in capital sentencing hearings,
is frequently admitted without any scrutiny whatsoever. 61
B. Juxtaposing Daubert and Barefoot in Future
Dangerousness Testimony
The issue of future dangerousness is unquestionably crucial.
Juries focus on this issue even where no testimony about future
danger has been admitted either at trial or in the sentencing
phase.67 Future dangerousness testimony is thus highly relevant to
the jury's decision. But this relevance is illusory if the information
presented to the jury is junk in the guise of science. The
paramount constitutional concerns regarding expert testimony
during sentencing are still, as they were in Barefoot, relevance and
reliability. The standards set out in the Daubert trilogy, however,
were not met by the Barefoot experts, nor by any experts offering
clinical judgments about future dangerousness since.68  The
question of whether clinical predictions are falsifiable is
controversial.69 The best medical diagnosis of current condition
requires personal examination and patient history, analyzed
against a background of empirical data about the etiology of the
disease being diagnosed." Falsifiability is absent, however, where
experts advance no hypothesis whatsoever, but only their personal
must be used in conjunction with mtDNA analysis. See id.
66 In Texas, for example, where the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
"there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society," there is virtually no restriction on the
scope of the expert's testimony, which frequently exceeds the bounds of scientific
possibility. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2 (b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
67 See Peter A. Barta, Between Death and a Hard Place: Hopkins v. Reeves and the
"Stark Choice" Between Capital Conviction and Outright Acquittal, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1429, 1466 (2000) (reporting that capital jurors in every jurisdiction focus on future
dangerousness even when the issue is never raised at trial).
68 The result has been a much more stringent admissibility standard for civil cases,
where money is at stake, than in criminal cases-including death penalty cases, despite
judicial rhetoric about death being different. See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness
Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1423 (1995) (observing that the
Daubert decision "implicitly recognized that trusting juries with unreliable expert
testimony is unwise, and thus imposed a reliability requirement on scientific expert
testimony that predictions of future dangerousness may well not satisfy").
69 See, e.g., Lidtz et al., supra note 3, at 1007 (acknowledging "little definitive
knowledge about how accurately clinicians make predictions of future violence").
70 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1.
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71prowess.
Future dangerousness testimony based on clinical judgment
alone has been overwhelmingly castigated by the profession (and
so fails peer review, publication, and the general acceptance
prongs of Daubert). Because such predictions are wrong more
often than they are right, they cannot meet the error rate inquiry."
Thus, it is plain that the future dangerousness testimony in
Barefoot, which was based neither on scientific study nor on
personal medical diagnosis, and did not even purport to be based
on the scientific method, cannot meet criteria for valid science.
Indeed, the basis for the Supreme Court's finding it
admissible was that even a layperson could testify to future
dangerousness.73 Unlike the laypersons involved, however, these
experts had no personal knowledge of the defendant. The
Barefoot experts, as most such experts still do in Texas, based their
testimony entirely on the defendant's conduct at trial and the facts
of the crime. This was enough, according to one of the experts, to
demonstrate future dangerousness with "one hundred percent and
absolute" accuracy. ' 74 That statement alone is enough to make his
testimony unreliable.75
One of the reasons for permitting all relevant evidence into a
sentencing hearing, regardless of whether it can meet the rules of
evidence (providing it is sufficiently reliable), is to assist the jury in
making an individualized determination of whether the death
penalty is appropriate given the particular circumstances of this
defendant. That is similar to the issue of "fit," which the Daubert
court explained concerns whether otherwise valid testimony will
71 Notably, it was precisely this kind of untestable psychiatric assertion that Karl
Popper was attempting to discredit in his work (cited as the basis for the scientific validity
inquiry in the Daubert opinion). A number of scholars have attempted to distinguish
between testimony based on scientific research and testimony based on clinical diagnosis.
See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Based Upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226,
1228 (1998) (asserting that "the inherent unreliability of clinical judgment and decision
making" is due to using flawed heuristics).
72 Although they made bald assertions that they were invariably accurate, the experts
in Barefoot offered no substantiation for their claims.
73 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983).
74 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75 No one can testify with "one hundred percent accuracy." Id. Nor had this expert
any empirical data to support his-highly improbable-statement. Such expert hyperbole is
by no means uncommon. A Texas psychiatrist, who by 1992 had participated in 144
capital cases, testified in each of them that, with medical and scientific certainty, he was
sure the defendant would kill again. See Joseph T. McCann, Standards for Expert
Testimony in New York Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jul.-Aug. 1996, at 30, 31
(outlining the prevalence of improper assessments of future dangerousness). One of those
condemned was later found to be innocent of the crime. See id. at 32.
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actually assist the factfinder.76 The Court pointed out in Joiner
that conclusions and methodology must have a valid connection
between them.77 Thus, unless an expert can demonstrate sound
methodology and scientific reasoning, no opinion testimony is
admissible.
If testimony is without foundation-that is, if testimony
purporting to be scientific is based on the expert's ipse dixit-it
cannot meet due process requirements of relevance and reliability.
Nonetheless, the argument that future dangerousness testimony is
inherently unreliable has been remarkably unsuccessful. 8 The
overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue
since Barefoot have simply found its constitutionality beyond
question. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1998, for
example, addressing the scientific validity of future dangerousness
testimony, found it to be reliable enough.79
There have been however, a few muted stirrings of unease.
For example, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the issue of whether
Daubert implicitly overruled Barefoot, although it declined to
reach that issue, in Tigner v. Cockrell."° In addition, concurring in
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' per curiam opinion in Flores v.
Johnson,8' Judge Garza excoriated the Texas courts' use of expert
future dangerousness testimony (but found himself bound
nonetheless by Barefoot).82 Further, as discussed above, in United
States v. Beckford, the court declined to permit evidence of
unadjudicated prior offenses to show future dangerousness on due
process grounds.
In Flores, Judge Garza discussed in detail the psychological
testimony used in Texas courts to support future dangerousness.
The expert who testified in Flores, Dr. Griffith, was "frequently
the state's star witness" and had never once testified that any
76 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
77 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997).
78 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 17 (observing that the political and legal
pressures on experts to predict violence in the United States and Canada are
overwhelming) (citing cases).
79 See Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1.998) (construing the Texas rules of
evidence, which require a similar inquiry to that of Daubert), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). "When addressing fields of
study aside from the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or fields that are based
primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific method, [the]
requirement of reliability applies but with less rigor than to the hard sciences." Nenno,
970 S.W.2d. at 561.
80 264 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing because a decision on collateral review
would have violated the non-retroactivity principle).
81 210 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
82 Id. at 464 (Garza, J., concurring) (castigating the "inadequacy of the science" behind
expert future dangerousness testimony); see also supra note 29.
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defendant did not pose a future danger. 3 Judge Garza observed
that it is still as true today as it was in Barefoot's time that
"[n]either the Court nor the State of Texas has cited a single
reputable scientific source contradicting the unanimous conclusion
of professionals in this field that psychiatric predictions of long-
term future violence are wrong more often than they are right."'
Moreover, when considered in juxtaposition with the strict
admissibility requirements for most expert testimony--especially
in civil trials, where the stakes are much lower-Dr. Griffith's
testimony became strikingly inadequate."
The Barefoot decision permitted experts to testify to future
dangerousness because the state permitted such testimony by lay
witnesses. Judge Garza pointed out that the problem with having
an expert rather than a lay person testifying to future
dangerousness is that it gives junk science the "imprimatur of
scientific fact. '86 Indeed, faced with such testimony, "juries are
almost always persuaded."" Although he acknowledged the jury's
right to impose death as an appropriate punishment for a vicious
crime, Judge Garza concluded that "the legitimacy of our legal
process is threatened" by allowing such testimony without any
scientific validity into evidence.8 Nonetheless, Flores' death
sentence was upheld.
Because juries give so much credence to expert testimony,
and because the scientific literature evaluating the predictive value
of clinical judgments about future violence has shown that such
expert predictions are no better than lay judgments, the reliability
standard articulated in Daubert and its progeny should apply to
future dangerousness evidence. If Daubert standards were applied
to the kinds of clinical predictions currently offered in our courts,
they would not be admitted because they do not meet any of the
criteria for scientific validity. This absence of scientific validity is
of heightened concern in the context of capital sentencing
hearings, where the jury hearing the evidence might very well
83 Flores, 210 F.3d at 462 (Garza, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 463 (Garza, J., concurring) (citing Justice Blackmun's Barefoot dissent).
85 Id. at 464 (Garza, J., concurring).
86 Id. at 466 (Garza, J., concurring). Judge Garza opined that admitting a psychiatric
prediction of dangerousness was akin to permitting a phrenologist-the example Justice
Stevens used in Joiner of junk science-to testify that the bumps on a defendant's skull
could predict dangerousness. Id. at 465 n.12. He noted that "the phrenologists' testimony
appears no less scientific."
87 Id. at 466. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged in the Flores case that,
with only one exception, it was unable to find the evidence insufficient in any case where
an expert had testified that the defendant posed a future danger. See Flores v. Johnson,
871 S.W.2d 714, 717 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
88 Flores, 210 F.3d at 470 (Garza, J., concurring).
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impose the death penalty. It is anomalous that more should be
required to demonstrate relevance and reliability in civil than
criminal cases.
III. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING VIOLENCE
Despite an ocean of disparaging commentary on the use of
future dangerousness testimony, it continues to find a place in
court.89 If, however, expert testimony were required to rest on
empirically sound foundations, do such foundations exist? Given
that current court predictions are woefully inaccurate, is it possible
to improve them? This section discusses the latest research on the
biology of violent behavior, which explains propensities toward
violence in terms of brain structure and function. This section
then outlines current research on violence prediction, contrasting
clinical predictions-which, at best, are only modestly better than
chance9°-with actuarial predictions, which appear to offer greater
accuracy than any other method of prediction.
A. The Biology of Violence
Violent behavior is at least partly based on biology. Violent
propensities have been shown to correlate with abnormalities in
the structure and function of the brain and the central nervous
system (CNS). These abnormalities, combined with
environmental factors-such as stress or drug and alcohol abuse-
can increase the chances that a particular individual will become
violent. Indeed, many of the risk factors measured by actuarial
assessments of violence risk (discussed later in this section) may be
tied to an underlying biological function. Thus, biology may
explain the statistical correlations between violence and risk
factors.'
89 See Mark. D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Don't Confuse Me With the Facts:
Common Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing, 26 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 20, 22 (1999).
90 See Monahan, supra note 3, at 903 (noting two studies showing that the clinicians
predicted violence with only a modest, 'though statistically significant, improvement over
chance); see also Shuman & Sales, supra note 71, at 1228 (critiquing the use of clinical
judgment testimony as lacking in scientific validity).
91 Correlation is the statistical degree of relationship between two variables. CHRIS
SPATZ, BASIC STATISTICS: TALES OF DISTRIBUTIONS 77, 81 (5th ed. 1993) (defining
correlation and explaining that the symbol for correlation-the correlation coefficient-is
r). A variable is something that can be quantified and that exists in more than one
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While we still do not know exactly how the brain works, we
have a good idea about its capabilities, and there is a growing body
of evidence on the biology of violence. Body, mind, and emotions
are the products of evolutionary processes.92 The human brain
processes information first through evolutionarily conserved
systems, that is, old, instinctive kinds of systems that are first and
foremost, "emotional."93 The newly evolved parts of the brain94
get their information from these primordial, emotional systems.
Dysfunction in the lower brain centers, such as the
amygdala,95 can create problems at the emotion-forming stage of
information processing.9 6 On the other hand, dysfunction of the
higher centers may create a lack of inhibition, allowing the release
of primordial instinctive behaviors.97 Any disruption in the
amount. Id. at 6. In simple terms, when there is a perfect correlation between two
variables, r = 1.00; when there is no correlation, r = 0. Id. at 81. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a
discussion of the risk factors measured by actuarial instruments.
92 See Jones, supra note 63, at 171 (noting that "because its neural architecture is
genetically influenced, the brain's processing pathways tend to reflect the cumulated result
of hundreds of millions of years of natural selection").
93 See ANTONIO R. DAMASio, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND
EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999). It has been suggested that the
term "feeling" should be reserved for the mental experience of an motion, while the term
"emotion" should be used to designate the collection of responses, many of which are
publicly observable. See id. at 42. It is in this context that we use the term emotion.
Lower brain centers support our emotions through motor, autonomic, and endocrine
responses that evolved as much for survival as for social signaling. In animals that have
consciousness, emotion permeates the thought process and is devoted to the organism's
survival. The biological function of emotion is to (1) produce a specific reaction, and (2)
regulate the internal state so it can be prepared for the specific reaction. See id. at 100.
It is these older, more primordial systems-which include such structures as the
reticular activating system (RAS), hypothalamus, and limbic system-that control arousal
levels and that first assess incoming sensory information in a "fight or flight" manner (kill
or be killed, attack prey, flee a predator, immediate survival response). If no immediate
threat exists, the information is assessed by these systems for benign adaptation (eat when
hungry, drink when thirsty, instinctive survival response).
94 These "higher" centers-which include the cerebral cortex, and are found in the
frontal lobes of the brain-are our most highly evolved brain structures. They are in
charge of critical judgment and learning. F.N. Dempster, The Rise and Fall of the
Inhibitory Mechanism: Toward a Unified Theory of Cognitive Development and Aging, 12
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 45 (1992).
95 See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
96 See DAMASIO, supra note 93, at 13.
97 If the cortex loses some of its inhibitory power, for example, by decreased blood
blow to the frontal cortex-known as "hypofrontality"-the individual will be more prone
to react to environmental stimuli with an exaggerated response. See, e.g., D.R.
Weinberger, On the Plausibility of "The Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis" of
Schizophrenia, 14 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1S-11S (1996) (finding that decreases
in frontal lobe function in normal adolescents, coupled with increased levels of sex
hormones, can lead to hyperresponsiveness to stimuli). Hypofrontality is present in a
number of psychiatric and neurological disorders, such as schizophrenia, biopolar
disorder, anxiety disorders, and major depression. See R.D. Skinner et al., Reduced
Sensory Gating of the P1 Potential in Rape Victims and Combat Veterans with Post
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information flow between higher and lower centers of the brain
affects reasoning, decision-making, and behavior."
There is some evidence, which is not without its critics,
suggesting that criminality and violence may have a genetic
component.99 Studies of petty criminals in Sweden and Denmark,
for example, observed that the biological parents-but not the
adoptive parents-had increased rates of criminality over the
population base rate.)0 Genes are not deterministic of behavior,
however. They may increase the likelihood (probability or risk)
that a behavior will occur, but they do not cause it directly. 101
Other studies suggest that structural dysfunction can
contribute to violent behavior. Damage, decreased uptake of
energy-producing glucose, reduced blood flow, and reduced
function have all been observed in the frontal cortex of violent
individuals and murderers. Studies using PET and SPECT, which
are imaging devices designed to measure brain function by
showing changes in the metabolism of energy-producing glucose,
demonstrate that murderers have decreased glucose utilization in
the frontal lobes compared to age- and gender-matched subjects.102
When these subjects were divided into two groups that either (1)
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 9 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 122 (1999); see also Edgar Garcia-
Rill, Disorders of the Reticular Activating System, 49 MED. HYPOTHESES 379 (1997)
(reviewing study that showed hypofrontality in schizophrenic patients). Hypofrontality
may also be responsible for the release of fixed action patterns, which are more complex
than reflexes, but less hierarchical than such planned voluntary motor strategies as writing
or speaking. See RODOLFO R. LLINAS, I OF THE VORTEX: FROM NEURONS TO SELF 134
(2001). These patterns can result in repetition of sequences of movements, e.g. stabbing
repeatedly, and may be part of uncontrolled action patterns rather than rage.
Hypofrontality has been shown to occur during dreaming, which may explain why we
accept our dreams so readily, why we do not question that we are flying or embroiled in an
unrealistic situation. See P. Maquet et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Human Rapid-
Eye-Movement Sleep and Dreaming, 383 NATURE 163 (1996).
98 This connectivity between the higher and lower centers, so critical to brain function,
will not be formed unless the central nervous system (CNS) is exposed to the
environment. For this reason, the influence of the environment on violent behavior cannot
be overlooked.
99 See DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: How UNDERSTANDING THE
BRAIN, BEHAVIOR, AND ENVIRONMENT CAN BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF
AGGRESSION 238 (1999). For a critical perspective, see STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE
MISMEASURE OF MAN 269 (2d ed. 1981).
101 See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 238. Notably, these studies did not examine violent
crime specifically, but included any criminal infractions as an outcome. See id. The theory
underlying these studies was that if the environment was the important variable rather
than inheritance, the rate should have been higher with both sets of parents.
101 See R. Plomin & M. Rutter, Child Development, Molecular Genetics, and What to
Do with Genes Once They Are Found, 69 CHILD DEV. 1223,1224 (1998).
102 See Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron
Emission Tomography, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 495 (1997); Adrian Raine et al.,
Selective Reductions in Prefrontal Glucose Metabolism in Murders, 36 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 365 (1994) [hereinafter Raine, Selective Reductions].
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had or (2) had not suffered early psychosocial deprivation-such
as childhood abuse or neglect-it was the group without
deprivation that had lower glucose metabolism in the frontal
lobes. 103 This study was extended to a population of impulsive
murderers" compared to a single predatory violent offender, 105
and the results suggest that impulsive murderers have decreased
glucose metabolism in the frontal lobes while predatory murderers
may not.1°6 Additional studies have found abnormal temporal lobe
metabolism in violent subjects.07
Lesions of the frontal lobes have been associated with
increases in the risk of aggressive and violent behavior.108 There
are reductions in the volumes of the frontal and temporal cortex in
violent and antisocial personality disorder patients."9 Reduced
blood flow to the frontal lobes, known as "hypofrontality," is
evident in such disorders as schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, and
depression." Interestingly, adolescents on average show a mild
form of this condition."' The brain, especially the frontal lobes, is
still maturing, so that the full-blown inhibition exercised by this
103 See Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain
Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective
Murders, 16 BEHAV. SCIENCES & LAW 319 (1998). However, in a study of a serial killer
with at least forty-five victims, glucose utilization in the frontal lobes was perfectly normal.
See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 111.
104 Impulsive aggression is defined as "a response to physical or verbal aggression
initiated by others that is relatively uncontrolled and emotionally charged." Raine, supra
note 103, at 320.
105 Predatory aggression is defined by the author as "controlled, purposeful aggression
lacking in emotion that is used to achieve a desired goal." Id. One problem with this type
of study is the subjective nature of its definitions.
"06 See Raine, Selective Reductions, supra note 102, at 370. A key problem here is that
comparison of one group to another that has a single member cannot said to be anything
more than suggestive of avenues for future research.
107 See D. Seidenwurm et al., Abnormal Temporal Lobe Metabolism in Violent Subjects:
Correlation of Imaging and Neuropsychiatric Findings, 18 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 625,
631 (1997); H. Soderstrom et al., Reduced Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in Non-Psychotic
Violent Offenders, 98 PSYCHIATRIC RES. IN NEUROIMAGING 29 (2000). The temporal
lobe contains limbic structures like the hippocampus and amygdala, which are associated
with emotional states.
108 See J. Graffman et al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression: A Report of
the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 NEUROLOGY 1231 (1996).
"09 See H. Critchley et al., Prefrontal and Medial Temporal Correlates of Repetitive
Violence to Self and Others, 47 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 928 (2000); Adrian Raine et al.,
Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial
Personality Disorder, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119 (2000).
110 See supra note 90. Overreactions to innocuous stimuli are likely in these disorders,
particularly the anxiety disorders. Events or conditions could easily lead to exaggerated
responses (panic attacks) or incapacitation (fear of leaving the house). Cornering such
individuals or placing them under undue stress could elicit exaggerated reactions, striking
out due to overperceived threats.
Il See J.N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999).
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region in adulthood is not yet in play during adolescence.'12 MRI
testing in adolescents shows mild decreases in frontal lobe function
compared to adults, which, coupled with increased levels of sex
hormones, can lead to hyperresponsiveness to stimuli."3  In
general, these results, along with neurocognitive models of
aggression and psychopathy,' 4 suggest that reduction of function in
the frontal lobes may be responsible for impaired critical judgment
and poor impulse control.
Studies on amygdalar function suggest that damage to this
part of the brain might lead to disengagement and lack of
empathy.' Electrically stimulating the amygdala can elicit the
physiological and behavioral signs of emotional states.' 6 On the
other hand, if the amygdala is destroyed, the result is an unusually
placid and emotionally unengaged individual."7  People and
animals with this condition cannot muster the emotions which
accompany fearful or painful situations. They are unable to
recognize the context of danger although they are capable of
emitting the right gestures."8  They may also be unable to
empathize with others who do feel the emotions of fear and pain."9
Environmental factors often play a role in violent behavior.
Animal studies have demonstrated that social isolation, for
example, can produce aggression that intensifies as the isolation
time increases, particularly when such isolation takes place at
puberty.12  Conversely, social interaction can lead to violent
tendencies in persons who associate with peer groups that engage
in deviant behavior. 2 ' Alcohol consumption, which can effectively
112 See id.; E.R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859 (1999).
113 See Weinberger, supra note 97, at 1S.
114 See R.J.R. Blair, Neurocognitive Models of Aggression, Antisocial Personality
Disorder, and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 727
(2001).
115 See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 92.
116 See id.
117 See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 98-99 (1994). This is known as the Kluver-Bucy syndrome. See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See D. Brunner & R. Hen, Insights into the Neurobiology of Impulsive Behavior
from Serotonin Receptor Knockout Mice, 836 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81 (1997); see also
MERLIN DONALD, A MIND So RARE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 150
(2001) (finding that socially isolated humans do not develop language or any form of
symbolic thought); L. Valzelli & S. Bernasconi, Aggressiveness by Isolation and Brain
Serotonin Turnover Changes in Different Strains of Mice, 5 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 129
(1979) (finding that aggression in isolated rats did not become manifest until after
puberty).
121 See Thomas J. Dishion et al., Peer Group Dynamics Associated with latrogenic
Effects in Group Interventions with High Risk Young Adolescents, 91 NEw DIRECTIONS IN
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diminish the activity of small brain cells responsible for cortical
function, figures into two out of every three violent crimes. 22
Physiological responses to environmental stimuli can also
predispose individuals to engage in violent behavior. For example,
some violent criminals have lowered CNS 123 and autonomic
nervous system (ANS) arousal.124 Measures of antisocial behavior
in fifteen year-old males have also been correlated with reduced
ANS activation.125  Further studies have shown that measures of
underarousal of the CNS and ANS taken at fifteen years of age
were related to criminality status assessed at twenty-four years of
age.12
6
Hormones, which are regulated by the hypothalamus and the
ANS, can play a role as well. Testosterone in boys surges at age
ten, rising to a plateau by age fourteen, when aggressive behavior
starts accelerating.' 27  However, delinquent behavior, adjustment
problems, and rebelliousness are actually more likely to be
associated with lower testosterone levels.2 1 Studies of recidivistic
violent offenders, adults with antisocial personality disorder, and
antisocial adolescents have all documented statistically significant
reductions in levels of cortisol, the main circulating stress
hormone.129 This suggests that psychopathy3 ° may involve a stress
CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEv. 79 (2001) (reviewing study finding that boys who did not
drink or smoke before the age of thirteen or fourteen, but who befriended boys who did,
advanced in statistically predictable ways to abuse drugs two years later); see also E.
Marshall, The Shots Heard Around the World, 289 Sci. 570, 573 (2000) (suggesting that
aggregating delinquents in group homes or sending them to prison is graduate school for
violence).
122 See J. Roizen, Issues of Epidemiologist of Alcohol and Violence, in ALCOHOL AND
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE: FOSTERING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 3-36
(Susan E. Martin ed., 1993).
123 The normal human CNS displays immediate, short-term, instinctive reflexive activity
as a first line of defense to real or perceived threats.
124 See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 181. Lowered levels of arousal were accompanied by
decreased activation of the reticular activating system (RAS), which is the part of the
brain that controls sleep/wake cycles and arousal, and lowered hypothalamic-modulated
stress responses. See id. Generally speaking, the hypothalamus-along with the RAS-
helps regulate the body's physiological response to stress, often referred to as "fight or
flight." Robert M. Sapolsky, The Stress Response and the Emergence of Stress-Related
Disease, in STRESS, THE AGING BRAIN, AND THE MECHANISMS OF NEURON DEATH 3-9
(Robert M. Sapolsky ed., 1999).
125 See Adrian Raine et al., Autonomic Nervous System Factors Underlying
Disinhibited, Antisocial, and Violent Behavior, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 46 (1996)
(reviewing study).
126 See Adrian Raine et al., Relationship Between Central and Autonomic Measures of
Arousal at Age 15 Years and Criminality at Age 24 Years, 47 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1003 (1990).
127 See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 159.
128 See id. at 160.
129 See B. Bergman & B. Brismar, Hormone Levels and Personality Traits in Abusive
and Suicidal Male Alcoholics, 18 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 311
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response disorder, one in which the response to a threat is too
weak rather than too strong. Psychopaths appear to lack a
conscience, but what they may lack is the biological machinery
necessary to warn them that they are heading for disaster."'
Current research on the biology of violence suggests that
violence is pathological, that it is "normal" aggression gone awry.
13 2
Violent tendencies can develop in early infancy,'33 or can emerge
after the onset of puberty. 34 Adolescence (that is, up to the age of
twenty-five) is not only the stage at which most violent crimes are
committed, it is also the stage at which hormone levels are
fluctuating widely.'35 The brain, especially the frontal lobes, is still
maturing during adolescence.'3 6  In addition, normal adolescents
appear to have a sensory gating deficit-an overresponsiveness to
repetitive or inconsequential stimuli-which also leads to
increased distractability.'37 Further, the brain structure changes
during adolescence: excess synapses in the brain that may have
(1994); B. McBumett et al., Anxiety, Inhibition, and Conduct Disorder in Children, 30 J.
Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 192 (1991); M. Virkunen, CSF
Biochemistries, Glucose Metabolism, and Dirunal Activity Rhythms in Alcoholic, Violent
Offenders, Fire Setters, and Healthy Volunteers, 51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 20
(1994); M. Virkunen, Urinary Free Cortisol in Habitually Violent Offenders, 72 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDANAVICA 40 (1985).
130 It is hard to define psychopathy. The problem is that no one is sure exactly what a
psychopath is. For example, Harris et al. describe psychopathy as "a lifelong persistent
condition characterized . . . by aggression beginning in early childhood, impulsivity,
resistance to punishment, general lack of emotional attachment or concern for others,
dishonesty and selfishness in social interactions, and high levels of promiscuous and
uncommitted sexual behavior." Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28
CRIME & JUST. 197, 197 (2001). The research of Raine et al., on the other hand, identifies
two kinds of psychopathy, impulsive and controlled. See Raine, supra note 125, at 46.
131 See NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 181.
132 See R.J. Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation a
Possible Prelude to Violence, 289 SCI. 591, 591 (2000). Aggression is thought to be part of
the normal repertoire of behaviors that has arisen to balance the need of the individual to
look out for himself and still maintain good standing within the group. See NIEHOFF,
supra note 99, at 76.
133 See F.B.M. De Waal, Primates: A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution, 289 SCI.
586, 586 (2000).
134 See, e.g., NIEHOFF, supra note 99, at 159 (1999).
135 See supra text accompanying note 121.
136 See supra notes l06-07 and accompanying text.
137 See Lisa Rasco et al., Effects of Age on Sensory Gating of the Sleep State-Dependent
P1/P50 Midlatency Auditory Evoked Potential, 3 SLEEP RES. ONLINE 97 (2000), at
http://www.sro.org/binlarticle.dll?Paper&1.930&0&0. Sensory gating has been
conceptualized as a critical function of the CNS to filter out extraneous information and to
focus on newer, more salient stimuli. Adding this distractability to a stressful environment
or other condition which increases arousal, e.g. hormones, probably increases the chances
of exaggerated responsiveness, too much "fight," or too much "flight." For a detailed
discussion of the stress response, see Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas,
Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9,12-14 (2001).
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developed in pre-teen growth spurts begin to be eliminated. All of
these brain changes, in conjunction with widely fluctuating
hormone levels, may explain why adolescents are at much greater
risk for engaging in violent behavior than any other age group.'38
Hypofrontality, associated with Axis I psychiatric disorders,3 9
may explain why some individuals who are experiencing active
symptoms of mental illness are at greater risk for committing acts
of violence.4 ° Hypofrontality, when caused by drug or alcohol use,
may further explain why substance abuse is also a risk factor for
violence. 4' Not surprisingly, some killers have demonstrably
decreased blood flow to the frontal lobes, and most violent
offenders lack the cognitive and control capacities of normal
adults.'42
Studies indicating that there may be two distinct groups of
violent offenders143 suggest that not all violence originates from the
same sources within the brain. These groups are distinguished by
the type of aggression they display. One group exhibits "impulsive
aggression," which is "a response to physical or verbal aggression
initiated by others with violence that is relatively uncontrolled and
emotionally charged.""' Others exhibit "predatory aggression,"
which is "controlled, purposeful aggression lacking in emotion that
is used to achieve a desired goal.""' Some interesting research
shows that offenders who display predatory aggression may suffer
from an under-active stress response,'46 while those exhibiting
impulsive violence suffered from an over-active stress response.'47
138 "Young age at time of first violent incident" is a risk factor measured by the HCR-
20. See CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., THE HCR-20 SCHEME: THE ASSESSMENT OF
DANGEROUSNESS AND RISK (1995); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT CRIME 1
(Apr. 1994) (reporting that people between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four
consistently commit the highest percentage of violent crimes), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/viocrm.pdf.
139 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
140 The HCR-20 lists active symptoms of major mental illness as a risk factor. See infra
notes 214-20 and accompanying text. Likewise, the VRAG lists meeting the DSM criteria
for schizophrenia as a risk factor. See infra text accompanying note 229. There is
however, research showing that the mentally ill as a group are no more violent than the
general population.
141 See supra text accompanying note 116; infra note 200 and text accompanying note
211.
142 See Paul H. Robinson, Preventing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429 (2001).
143 See Raine, supra note 103, at 320.
144 Id.
14 Id.
146 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
14v See Raine, Selective Reductions, supra note 102, at 2 (finding that impulsive
murderers have decreased glucose metabolism in the frontal lobes while predatory
murderers do not).
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This research-particularly the studies on predatory violent
offenders-may suggest why psychopathy is a risk factor for future
violence.148
Other risk factors-those one could call sociological rather
than biological-such as family situation, poverty, high-crime
neighborhoods, and urban residence may also affect stress levels,
thereby leading to biological repercussions. Current research in
neuroscience indicates that violent behavior is a complex
intermingling of nature and nurture. It may be that
"neuropsychological impairments disrupt normal development and
increase vulnerability" to poor social environments.'49
The brain is a complex system, understandable only in a
statistical sense. Complex systems can only be considered in a
statistical manner because they are probabilistic, not certain.'o
With this in mind, risk assessment could perhaps provide the
critical link between biology and the probability that violence will
eventually manifest itself in a given individual.
B. Assessing Risk: A New Paradigm for Predicting Violence
In a parallel development with the growth of knowledge
about brain structure and function (and largely isolated from it) is
the burgeoning field of risk assessment. 5  The idea of risk
encompasses notions of statistical probability, factor analysis, and
the likelihood of event occurrence.'52 The idea of risk with respect
to violent behavior has a number of advantages over the notion of
future dangerousness. Risk shifts the focus from a yes/no analysis
to a probabilistic statement and requires balancing the seriousness
of the possible outcome with the probabilities of their occurrence
based on specific risk factors.'53 The key variables in risk
assessment of any stripe are the outcomes, their probabilities of
148 See infra notes 194, 199 and text accompanying note 211.
149 James C. Howell & J. David Hawkins, Prevention of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 263, 268 (1998) (citing Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence Limited and Life-Course-
Persistent Antisocial Behavior.: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCH. REV. 674 (1993)).
150 See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE
LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 18 (1995).
151 See Monahan, supra note 3, at 914. Something is a risk factor if it precedes the
outcome (violence, in this case) and correlates with the outcome. Helena Kraemer et al.,
Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (1997).
152 See Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology,
4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452,452 (1998).
153 See David Carson, A Risk-Management Approach to Legal Decision-Making About
'Dangerous' People, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: RISKS AND LEGAL PROCESS 20
(Robert Baldwin ed., 1997) (discussing the paradigm shift from dangerousness to risk).
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occurrence, the uncertainty about the outcomes, and time."' Risk
assessment is supposed to objectively quantify the probabilities
and consequences of adverse events by looking at physical and
natural processes.' Risk is a central concern of insurance,
business, government regulation (including environmental
legislation), and health. Risk management is increasingly seen as
the provenance of penology. 6  Criminal justice is becoming
actuarial, and the use of statistics to conceive group boundaries is
gaining prominence.5 7
When we speak of predicting violent behavior, we are
assessing the risk that an individual will become violent at some
later date. Although various risk factors have been analyzed and
numerous studies corroborate their relationship to violent
behavior, that is merely the beginning of risk analysis. No one of
these factors, standing alone, has significant predictive power; they
must be analyzed in concert. 8 One of the significant problems
with clinical judgment is an apparent inability to adjust predictions
according to these interrelationships. 5 9
1. Clinical Predictions
A number of studies about human decisionmaking illustrate
why clinical judgments about future dangerousness tend to be
error prone and unreliable. 16° Experts, like lay people, tend to use
a number of flawed heuristics to simplify decisionmaking.' 61 These
154 See K.R. MCCRIMMON & D.A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY (1988).
155 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk
Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 63 (discussing risk analysis and
differences among population groups in risk assessment).
156 See Simon, supra note 152, at 452 (discussing the transformation of penology from
seeing crime as a problem of molding offenders to community norms to "managing high-
risk categories and subpopulations").
157 For example, a number of risk assessment tools are used in making decisions about
parole. See M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial
Measures and the Role of the Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 303, 304 (2000)
(listing assessment instruments used for parole determinations).
158 See John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in 1 DAVID
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 7-2.1.1 (Supp. 2000) (noting that "it is crucial for future
studies to use multiple measures of violence rather than the single measures that have
characterized most prior research").
159 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 56.
160 See Shuman & Sales, supra note 71, at 1228-29 (discussing heuristics and biases in
clinical judgment).
161 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES (1982). A base rate is the rate at which a particular outcome (such as
violence) occurs throughout the population. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 89, at
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flawed heuristics contribute to the high error rate.
One of these flawed heuristics is the representativeness
heuristic. Clinical decisionmakers tend to erroneously assume the
representativeness of events by ignoring sample sizes and base
rates.6 2 In addition, clinicians, like other people, tend to think
they have more information than they really do.'63 Clinicians
(again, like other people) are poor at making extreme judgments;
they tend to have more confidence in predictive variables with
extreme values than is warranted. 164 In other words, although it is
more difficult to predict statistically rare events (like violence),
clinical judgments frequently fail to take that into account. 165
Ignoring base rates is a particular problem in predicting
violence where the base rate of violent behavior is low overall and
varies among different population sub-groups. 16 6 These cognitive
phenomena are particularly troubling when the task is predicting
violent behavior, and clinicians tend to use these error-inducing
heuristics as often as lay people in making these assessments. 167
Clinicians, like other people, tend to be swayed by their
stereotypes and prejudices, against which they measure the
patient's behavior and which, because they have no relevance to
medical expertise, may taint the decision. 168
A further problem with clinical judgments is that there is no
way to assess the individual error rate of the particular expert
proffering a future dangerousness opinion. 169 There is no way to
know how many times the expert has opined that someone was
dangerous when he was not (or vice-versa). Clinical judgment is
23.
162 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972). These shortcuts are not
consciously employed, but operate on a subliminal level to affect decisionmaking. Id.
163 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 56.
164 See H. Einhorn & R. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of
Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395 (1978).
165 See JOHN W. PARRY ET AL., AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH AND
PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 20 (1998) (noting that "it is difficult to
predict with certainty occurrences of statistically rare events").
166 See id. at 223 (explaining how the statistical base-rate problem affects predictions of
dangerousness); QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 60.
167 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 62 (in a study assessing predictions of violence, "lay
persons and the clinicians had few differences of opinion"); Shuman & Sales, supra note
71, at 1228 (noting that "expert judgments that are clinically derived, as opposed to
actuarially derived, are as susceptible to error as lay judgements").
'6' See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28 n.5 (quoting Judge Bazelon).
169 See id. at 25 (noting the problem of illusory correlations when assessors-who usually
have no information about the accuracy of their predictions-learn of a violent action by a
previously assessed patient, making that instance stand out and giving the clinicians a
mistakenly optimistic view of their own prowess).
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thus virtually untestable.7 ° Reliance on personal experience can be
much improved if it is augmented by statistically analyzed data,
and that is the insight behind the development of a number of
actuarial instruments for predicting human violence.
Repeated studies of actuarial methods have demonstrated
them to be superior to clinical judgment standing alone.17 1 Even
such instruments however, with their structured reasoning
requirements, do not obviate all the problems of human judgment.
For example, the risk factor descriptions may be vague, decreasing
their reliability."' Sometimes the factors are not independent, for
example anger and the inability to sustain relationships. 7 1
Moreover, the time period that the risk assessment is to cover, the
circumstances under which it will be implemented (prison for life,
in the case of capital sentencing, and the perhaps eventual release
into the community after serving a minimum term of the life
sentence),174 and the individual's motivation to refrain from
violence (including motivation to comply with treatment), must all
be taken into consideration in assessing risk. 175 Yet rarely are they
addressed, either in court or in the actuarial instruments. A major
problem with each of the risk instruments is its failure to correlate
the risk factors with neuroscience and evolutionary biology. 76
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that risk is a social
construct. Although it uses probabilistic analysis and
quantification, it is not an exact science.7 7 Indeed, all science is
value-laden, and risk assessment is not different in that regard.7 1
Using structured analysis however, offers many advantages in
human decisionmaking, particularly in light of the difficulty people
have in synthesizing differently weighted likelihoods of varying
significance (such as risk factors for violent behavior). 79  Thus,
170 See Shuman & Sales, supra note 71, at 1227 (noting the problem of unvalidated
theories and skills).
171 See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 89, at 28 (citing studies).
172 See Carson, supra note 153, at 258 (noting the problem of reliability). For example,
even trained clinicians may differ on what exactly is meant by "glibness" (a factor on the
PCL-R) or "lack of insight" (a factor on the VRAG and HCR-20).
173 See id.
'74 If permitted by statute; in some states, life term is without parole.
'75 See id. at 261.
176 But see Harris et al., supra note 130, at 197 (attempting to correlate the PCL-R with
neuroscience and conceding that much research still needs to be done).
177 See ROYAL SOCIETY, RISK: ANALYSIS, PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT 7 (1992)
(explaining that some subjectivity is always a part of risk assessment).
178 See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for
Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1563 (2000).
179 See J. RICHARD EISER & JOOP VAN DER PLIGT, ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS 100
(1988) (observing that human decision "accuracy declines considerably when the number
of features or the number or alternatives increases .... [and] reliability with which choice
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actuarial instruments may offer a distinct advantage in assessing
risk of violent behavior.1 8°
2. Actuarial Instruments
One way to counter human cognitive error is to create a
scoring instrument that takes into account the interrelationship of
various risk factors, the population base rates, and assigns weights
to the individual risk factors. Human judgment is not abandoned,
it is simply structured into a formal reasoning process. 8' Although
there is some evidence that a multi-disciplinary team may be able
to rival the accuracy of actuarial instruments, empirical data
demonstrates that such structured analysis improves
decisionmaking considerably.182 Moreover, in a legal system that
places some value on cost/benefit analyses, actuarial instruments
are not only more accurate, they are also more cost-effective.
Actuarial instruments are risk assessment tools that combine
a number of risk factors in order to achieve an overall "score" that
ranks levels of risk. 183  Currently, there are three prominent
instruments used in assessing violence, the Violence Risk
Assessment Guide (VRAG), 184 the Historical/ Clinical Risk
Management 20-item scale (HCR-20), 185 and the Psychopathy
Checklist (Revised) (PCL-R).'86 A number of studies of these
instruments have shown that actuarial measures are more accurate
predictors than clinical judgment. 87  Occasionally, these actuarial
studies are finding their way into court.87 The question is whether
rules are used tends to decrease as the decision-maker's information load increases").
180 See N. Morris & M. Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1-50 (M. Tonry & M. Miller eds., 1985).
181 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 65; Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 304 (observing
that "[s]tructured clinical judgment represents a composit of empircal knowledge and
clinical/professional expertise").
182 See J. Fuller & J. Cowan, Risk Assessment in a Multidisciplinary Forensic Setting:
Clinical Judgement Revisited, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 276 (1999).
183 See Monahan, supra note 3, at 903 (evaluating risk assessment instruments).
'8' See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 141.
185 See CHRISTOPHER D. WEBSTER ET AL., HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK OF VIOLENCE
VERSION 2 (1997).
186 See R. D. HARE, MANUAL FOR THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED
(1991).
187 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 303 (citing studies).
188 In United States v. Barnette, the prosecution expert used the PCL-R to substantiate
his opinion that the defendant posed a future danger. 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000). The
court upheld the admissibility of this testimony under Daubert, although it declined to
decide whether a Daubert analysis was required. Id. at 815. The court found that because
the prosecution expert had based his opinion on the PCL-R together with the fourth
edition Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV), produced by the American
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they offer a more accurate means of assessing future
dangerousness.
a. PCL-R
The PCL-R is an instrument that is designed to measure a
"psychological construct" known as "psychopathy."189 No one is
quite sure what psychopathy means,"9 but researchers seem to
agree that the PCL-R can be used to predict recurring violence.19
The goal of the instrument is to predict violence in offenders and
psychiatric patients by assessing "a constellation of affective,
interpersonal and behavioural characteristics." '192 The instrument
consists of twenty risk factors, scored on a three-point scale, with a
score of greater than 30 (on a 40-point scale) indicating a strong
propensity for violence.193 The twenty factors are: Glibness/
superficial charm; grandiose sense of self-worth; need for
stimulation/ proneness to boredom; pathological lying; conning/
manipulative; lack of remorse or guilt; shallow affect; callous/ lack
of sympathy; parasitic lifestyle; poor behavioral controls;
promiscuous sexual behavior; early behavioral problems; lack of
realistic long-term goals; impulsivity; irresponsibility; failure to
accept responsibility; many short-term marital relationships;
juvenile delinquency; revocation of conditional release; criminal
versatility.194
Psychiatric Association, and with "observations of Barnette's behavior; the actuarial
approach; and the research on predicting future dangerousness" that it met Daubert's
reliability standard. Id. at 816. The court was careful to point out that just because
testimony is admissible does not mean it cannot be attacked under cross-examination. Id.
189 Harris et al., supra note 130, at 197 (2001).
190 See id. at 197-98 (asserting that "[p]sychopathy is a real phenomenon ....
characterized, in males at least, by aggression beginning in early childhood, impulsivity,
resistance to punishment, general lack of emotional attachment or concern for others,
dishonesty and selfishness in social interactions, and high levels of promiscuous and
uncommitted sexual behavior .... mediated.., by genes that modulate some
neuroanatomical structures an monoamine oxidase-type A (MAO) neurotransmitters")
(no citations given).
191 See Darryl G. Kroner & Jeremy F. Mills, The Accuracy of Five Risk Appraisal
Instruments in Predicting Institutional Misconduct and New Convictions, 28 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 471, 473 (2001) (asserting that "the PCL-R has been shown to have utility in
predicting criminal behavior" and citing studies).
192 Robert D. Hare, The Hare PCL-R Some Issues Concerning its Use and Misuse, 3
LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCH. 99, 100 (1998).
193 It has been supplemented for institutional screening purposes by the PCL-SV, which
consists of only twelve items, with scores ranging from 0-24, and a cut-off score for
violence above 18. The twelve items for the PCL-SV are: Superficial; grandiose;
manipulative; lacks remorse; lacks empathy; does not accept responsibility; impulsive;
poor behavioral controls; lacks goals; irresponsible; adolescent antisocial behavior; adult
antisocial behavior. See id.
194 Id. at 306, tbl. 1.
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These factors are of two types: one that describes
interpersonal dimensions (such as shallowness, callousness,
dishonesty), and one that describes behavior (such as juvenile
delinquency, criminal versatility, impulsivity), and the factors
overlap somewhat with the American Psychiatric Association's
concept of antisocial personality disorder.'95 Although these
factors appear to be rather subjective, Hare argues that "the
scoring criteria for each item.., are explicit, and the meaning of
an item (e.g., shallow affect) is based on these criteria, not on what
the title of the item might mean to an individual clinician or
researcher."'96
The information in the scoring instrument is derived from the
subject's entire lifetime, so it cannot measure changes in symptoms
(in response to treatment, for example).' 97 The base rate in the
offender population (those who have committed violent acts and
those who have not) for violent propensities defined according to
the PCL-R is fifteen to twenty-five percent in North America. 198
That is, fifteen to twenty-five percent of the general prison
population is characterized as violent according to this
instrument. 199 Both the VRAG and the HCR-20 incorporate the
PCL-R, although the VRAG eliminated the clinical assessment
component (and thus the subjectivity) and garnered the
information strictly from the subject's file."
One of the major problems with this instrument is that it is
simply not available to anyone who wishes to examine it.21 Thus,
it fails one of the important criteria of falsifiability, the willingness
to submit to critique (including interdisciplinary critique).20 2 It is
designed to be administered by specifically trained individuals on
the basis of a semi-structured interview and file information
(although it can be based on file information alone).0 3 In addition,
195 See Harris et al., supra note 130, at 204 (noting that Hare has since expanded the
concept of psychopathy from two to three factors, but that this expansion is largely
untested).
196 Hare, supra note 192, at 109.
197 See id. at 116.
'98 See id. at 101 (noting the consistency of the base rate across differing populations
and asserting that there is no evidence the test is biased due to race or mental disorder).
19 See id. at 116.
200 See Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at 480.
20' See Hare, supra note 192, at 108-13 (arguing that only professionals trained in "the
Hare PCL-R training program" should be allowed access to the instrument, particularly in
litigation, and castigating judges who have made the instrument part of the public record-
until threatened with copyright suits-and lawyers who have disseminated the instrument
to clients).
n Beecher-Monas, supra note 178.
203 See Hare, supra note 192, at 101, 110 (stating that individuals must be "qualified to
purchase or use" the Hare instrument). Notably, because only people who have gone
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a number of researchers have criticized the PCL-R because some
of the scoring variables on the checklist are not independent-that
is, they are confounded. 20°  For example, some of the checklist
items-like pattern of past violence-are linked to the outcome
variable (violence), and this necessitates either statistical control
for past criminal activity or removing confounding items from the
checklist. °5 However, when testing whether the instrument simply
measured "a lengthy history of officially recorded criminal
conduct, 2 researchers concluded that it had a "unique effect. 27
In other words, it does something more than just measure past
patterns of violent conduct.
Nevertheless, even the instrument's author recognizes its
subjective nature and recommends that "at least two independent
ratings be obtained and averaged." 08 People with a vested interest
in the outcome are told that they should not administer the test
(which makes one wonder about its suitability for litigation
purposes) .209 Moreover, attempts to define terms like
"psychopath" have been weak.2 10 Further, there is some question
about its applicability to United States populations, because efforts
at evaluating the PCL-R have been conducted almost entirely in
Canada, where the minority population is much smaller. At least
one recent study has challenged the PCL-R's applicability to
African-Americans, concluding that there are substantial
differences in population groups with respect to the distribution of
psychopathy scores, the relation of psychopath to impulsiveness,
and the relevance of the underlying factors.211 Despite these major
problems, many researchers consider the instrument to have at
through Hare's qualification program may have access to the instrument, this isolates the
Hare instrument from the robust critique that Karl Popper advocated as a prerequisite to
valid science.
204 Confounders are unobserved variables that are correlated with the independent and
dependent variables. See David H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert. Methodology,
Conclusions and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REv. 1933, 1998
(2001).
205 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 305.
206 Harris et al., supra note 130, at 199.
207 When the researchers entered the "four best predictors reflecting criminal history"
first into a multiple regression analysis, they found that the instrument still "showed a
unique effect of psychopathy in the prediction of violent recidivism." Id. at 199. The
researchers do not quantify their findings however, so it is impossible to tell how unique
the effect was, or what conduct was being measured.
2 Hare, supra note 192, at 113.
2 See id. at 116.
210 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 27 n.3.
211 See Robert T. Salekin et al., A Review and Meta-Analysis of the Psychopathy
Checklist and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised: Predictive Validity of Dangerousness, 3
CLIN. PSYCH. 203,208 (1996).
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least some predictive value for community violence,212 and it is
frequently used in prisons to determine eligibility for parole. It
was also used by the prosecution expert in Barnett in the capital
sentencing phase, and may see increased use in the courts. In
comparison studies, however, the VRAG (which uses the PCL-R
as one of its risk factors but without the clinical interview) had
considerably better prediction rates.213
b. HCR-20
This instrument is a scoring device developed to predict
violent behavior in criminal and psychiatric populations. 214  It
consists of twenty factors, ten taken from the subject's history (two
of which address personality dysfunction); five clinical factors; and
five risk management factors.215 The information is gathered from
clinical interviews, reports from family members, and file
records.2 6  In two studies the historical factors showed better
correlation with violent outcomes than the clinical factors."7 In a
retrospective study of violent offenders, the ten historical factors
performed better than the VRAG.218 This makes sense because in
a study of predictive factors for violent behavior, using a meta-
analysis of sixty-four separate studies employing twenty-seven
predictors, Bonta et al. found that the largest effects came from
criminal history variables, followed by personal demographics,
deviant lifestyle, and lastly, clinical variables.219 The HCR-20 and
the PCL-R have been shown to perform similarly in predicting
post-release behavior in a number of tests.22°
212 See John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing
Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 312, 320 (2000). "Some" predictive value is not
quantified by the author. See id.
213 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 307; see also Kroner & Mills, supra note 191,
at 481.
214 See WEBSTER, supra note 138.
215 See id. at 27. The historical factors are previous violence; young age at first violent
incident; relationship instability; employment problems; substance use problems; major
mental illness; psychopathy; early maladjustment; personality disorder; prior supervision
failure. See id. at 27-46. The clinical factors are lack of insight; negative attitudes; active
symptoms of major mental illness; impulsivity; unresponsive to treatment. See id. at 49-58.
The risk management factors are: plans lack feasibility; exposure to destabilizers; lack of
personal support; noncompliance with remediation attempts; and stress. See id. at 61-70.
216 See Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at 474.
217 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 305.
218 See M. GRANN, PERSONALITY DISORDER AND VIOLENT CRIMINALITY WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PSYCHOPATHY AND RISK ASSESSMENT (1998).
219 See J. Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among
Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSCHOL. BULL. 123 (1998).
m See Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at 480 (citing studies).
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c. VRAG
Of the three instruments addressed here, the most statistically
sophisticated is the VRAG.221 The goal of the VRAG study was to
create an' actuarial instrument capable of predicting which
offenders would commit at least one violent act, given the
opportunity.222  "Violence" is measured by any new criminal
charge (or act in subsequent institutionalization that would
otherwise have resulted in a criminal charge) for a violent
offense. 3 Violence was defined as homicide, attempted homicide,
kidnapping, forcible confinement, wounding, assault causing
bodily harm, rape, armed robbery, and all sexual assaults involving
physical contact.224 Opportunity was defined as being released into
the community, a half-way house, or a minimum-security
psychiatric hospital.225
A large number of independent variables (over fifty) were
examined, and twelve were selected for the instrument (based on
independent empirical data), and given "Pearson correlations" (a
weighted number, each of which is added to yield a final score).226
These twelve variables had been independently reported by
independent investigators.27  They consist of the following:
Revised Psychopathy Checklist Score; Elementary School
Maladjustment Score; meets DSM-III criteria for personality
disorder; age at the time of the initial offense; separation from
either parent under age sixteen (except for death); failure on prior
conditional release; nonviolent offense history score; never
married (or equivalent); DSM III criteria for schizophrenia;
serious victim injury; alcohol abuse score; whether the victim of
the index offense was female.228 Scoring using the instrument is
accomplished by examining each of the factors and adding the
scores of each. This total score is then placed within one of nine
categories corresponding to incrementally greater rates of
221 See id. at 482, tbl. 3 (finding ROC values for "major misconduct"-defined as
inciting a riot, drug/alcohol use; refusing urinalysis; assaults; and refusing a direct order-
of .575 for the PCL-R; .565 for the HCR-20, and .627 for the VRAG). Note that chance is
defined as an ROC of .50, making none of these instruments fabulously predictive.
Moreover, the outcomes measured are qualitatively different from the kind of violence
that concerns death penalty juries.
222 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 145.
m See id. at 142.
22A See id.
2 See id. at 145.
226 See id. at 147; see also supra note 216.
2 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 145.
228 See id. at 147.
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recurring violence.229
The instrument was tested on institutionalized offenders who
had an opportunity to recommit over 81.5 months.230  The subjects
of the study were 618 men institutionalized at a high security
mental institution.1 Of the 618 subjects studied, 191 (31%)
committed new acts of violence.232 If the scores of the subjects
were divided into "high" and "low" risk groups, fifty-five percent
of the "high risk" group committed new violent acts, compared to
nineteen percent of the "low risk" group. 233
Using sophisticated statistical analyses, the VRAG authors
determined that they had achieved significant results.234  The
authors acknowledge that the accuracy of the instrument depends
on the base rate of violent recidivism in the population being
studied, so that at very low base rates predictions would not be
worthwhile. 35  Independently, other investigators tested the
instrument and found it superior to other instruments used to
identify future misconduct.236
The authors of the VRAG attribute its accuracy to having
measured the variables with reference to "detailed and complete
psychosocial histories" gleaned from collateral sources (i.e., family
members), descriptions of actual behavior rather than self-
reporting, and "reliance on hypothetical internal psychological
states" as its basis .23  Although they acknowledge that the
instrument is not nearly as accurate as concurrent diagnostic
tests238 or short-term weather predictions,239 the authors contend
229 See R. Mark Binderman, Understanding VRAG: The Violence Risk Assessment
Guide, FORENSIC EXAMINER, Jan-Feb. 2001, at 28, 29 (using the example of an individual
with a score of twenty-three, placing the individual in the category of subjects who had a
76% rate of recurring violence over seven years, and 98% more violent than the control
group in the original study).
23o See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 142.
23, See id. at 145. Although these were mental patients, the authors noted that their
characteristics were not very different from those of correctional institutions, and although
they suffered from psychoses at a higher rate, that is a variable not likely to increase
violent recidivism in offender populations. See id. (citing Bonta et al., supra note 219).
232 Binderman, supra note 229, at 29.
233 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 33 (computing risks of dangerousness).
234 See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
235 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 152 (noting that "when the base rate is low enough,
the optimal decision is to release everyone").
236 See id. at 151.
237 Id. at 165 (observing that one reason for this may be that "the defining properties of
psychopathy (lying, conning, and glib speech)" may increase measurement error during
personal interviews).
2-38 The accuracy of concurrent diagnostic tests achieves an ROC of over .90, as
compared with the VRAG's .73. Id. at 168.
239 The authors insist that "the prediction of weather phenomena (where there is
essentially zero outcome measurement error) probably cannot be accomplished in the
prediction of violent recidivism." Id. John Monahan and Henry Steadman similarly draw
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that the instrument at least rivals the accuracy of predicting violent
storms.240
IV. ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF ACTUARIAL
PREDICTIONS
The scientific validity of actuarial predictions depends upon
probabilistic assessment of data, independent verification of
procedures, and concern over false positives. Scientists
recognize that the precise prediction of future behavior is
impossible-whether the subject is the weather or human violence,
the most that can be predicted is its probability. The scientific
validity of such predictions requires evaluation of probabilistic
reasoning, an evaluation that focuses on falsifiability,
interdisciplinarity, and rationality, emphasizing the explanatory
power of a proposed hypothesis.242
Scientific predictions are a form of risk analysis, a statistical
methodology commonly used by epidemiologists, toxicologists, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the insurance industry,
among others-but is it scientifically valid for predicting human
behavior rather than disease? The answer to that question
requires an evaluation not only of the mathematical logic, but also
of the underlying theory. Statistical analysis provides an important
tool for examining whether theories correspond with
observation.243 However, one cannot expect statistics to provide an
answer about any particular individual.244 The most that can be
said from even the best statistical analyses is that someone falls
within a group that has a certain statistical propensity for
an explicit analogy to weather reports in advocating the use of actuarial instruments and
probabilistic communication for predicting violence. See John Monahan & Henry
Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People. How Meteorology Can Inform Risk
Communication in Mental Health Law, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Sept. 1996, at 931.
240 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 168.
241 See generally Beecher-Monas, supra note 178.
242 See id. at 1579.
243 See Kenneth J. Rothman, Significance Questing, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 445,
445 (1986) (editorial).
244 As epidemiologists studying the statistical incidence of disease have discovered, one
simply cannot predict the probability of disease in any given case. See Sander Greenland
& Jerome Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40
JURIMETRICS 321, 328 (2000) (explaining that "when an exposure is known to be harmful
in some cases, available data from epidemiology and biology are simply incapable of
telling us whether a given case was 'more probably than not' harmed by exposure"). The
most that can be said is that exposure caused a certain statistical increase of disease over
background levels.
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violence.245  Moreover, statistical measurements must be
understood within the context of the system being studied.246
Here, the context is human behavior, a quintessentially complex
phenomenon. Complexity theory recognizes the continuous
interaction of individuals with the whole system of which they are
a part, and who respond to both random events and dynamic
phenomena. 47
The framework for this analysis is taken from an earlier
article, in which I argued that in order to meet Daubert criteria a
judge must be able to do five things: (1) identify and examine the
proffered theory and hypothesis for their power to explain the
data; (2) examine the data that supports (and undermines) the
expert's theory; (3) use supportable assumptions to fill the
inevitable gaps between data and theory; (4) examine the
methodology; and (5) engage in probabilistic assessment of the
link between the data and the hypothesis. 48 This framework seeks
to provide a structured reasoning process for examining scientific
validity that goes beyond-while satisfying-the sketchy Daubert
guidelines of testability, peer review, and publication, existence of
protocols and error rates, and general acceptance.2 9 In each
section of the analysis (i.e. the explanatory power of the
theory/hypothesis), satisfaction of the inquiry also satisfies one or
more of the Daubert factors, although the underlying inquiry goes
to the heart of what I believe the Daubert court was aiming for.50
245 The concept of probability I am referring to is the idea of long-run relative
frequency. See THEODORE COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 63 (1974) (defining the
"probability of an event [as] the event's long-run relative frequency in repeated trials
under similar conditions"). That is, the probability of recurring violence is its relative
frequency of occurrence-or the proportion of times the event occurs-in a large number of
trials repeated under virtually identical conditions. Id. "Virtually identical conditions"
are hard to come by in observational studies of humans (such as the studies underlying the
violence risk assessment tools). This is a pervasive problem for human studies, but one
that does not necessarily undermine their validity. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 178, at
1604-07 (discussing scientific validity of human studies).
246 See COLTON, supra note 245, at 117, 304 (explaining that although a result may be
statistically significant, it may still be medically meaningless, and cautioning against
permitting statistical analyses to generate hypotheses).
247 See id. at 20 (noting the "continuous conversation between parts and wholes").
248 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 178, at 1571.
249 See id. at 1567.
2 See generally id.
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A. What's the Theory? The Explanatory Power of Theory
and Hypothesis
1. Statistical Theory
The theory underlying each of the actuarial instruments used
in predicting future violence is first that violent behavior is
statistically correlated2 11 with specific factors either in peoples' past
behavior (a pattern of past violence, for example), their
circumstances (poverty, for example), their attitudes toward others
(failure to marry or form equivalent relationship), their medical
and psychiatric history (age when problems began, and any
injuries to the brain), and substance abuse (alcohol or drugs); and
second, that these factors in combination can be used to
probabilistically assess a level of risk for the future. The variables
considered for the instruments were drawn from empirical studies
showing a statistical association25 2 with violent behavior.
In constructing the VRAG, for example, an offender
population was divided into two groups, one that had committed a
further act of violence and one that had not.253 The overall base
rate for re-offending was thirty-one percent.254 Violent offenders
who had married had a "violent recidivism rate" (that is they re-
offended at a rate) of twenty-one percent, while those who had not
251 See GOULD, supra note 99, at 269, explaining that "[c]orrelation assesses the
tendency of one measure to vary in concert with another." Correlation is measured-for
linear relationships-by Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, which ranges
from +1 for perfect positive correlation, 0 for no correlation, to -1 for perfect negative
correlation. See id. at 270.
252 Association means that there is a statistically significant correlation of a particular
factor with violent behavior. Statistical significance is set by convention at a level of
significance, or p-value of .05 (which corresponds to a confidence level of 95 percent). The
object of statistical significance tests is to keep the scientist from asserting a positive effect
when the effect may actually be due to chance. See David Ozenhoff & Leslie I. Bodin,
Truth & Consequences: Health Agency Responses to Environmental Health Problems, 12
Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 70, 73-74 (1987). If the p-value is .01, the evidence is said to
be highly statistically significant. See Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and
Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Litigation, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 22 (1995). "By rejecting
a hypothesis only when the test is statistically significant, we have placed an upper bound,
5%, on the chance of rejecting a true hypothesis." Id. Another way of explaining this is
that it describes the probability that the procedure produced the observed effect by
chance. See id. If the test is not statistically significant, it may either be because the
results were due to chance or because the test lacked the power to discern a difference
between the null hypothesis and the proposed effect. See id. Power increases with the size
of the study and with the degree of difference from the null hypothesis (the more extreme
the alternatives, the better the power). See id.
253 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 75.
254 Id. at 147.
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married re-offended at a rate of thirty-eight percent.255 This is not
a theory that failure to marry causes violence; as a technique, it is
more like diagnosing illness, where a "convergence of signs,
symptoms, outcome, and patterns of familial aggregation" are
examined with only the sketchiest of underlying causal theories. 6
The most that can be said is that marriage and a decreased
propensity for violence are statistically associated; they are found
together in a significant percentage of the population being
studied.
These factors are not "causes" of violence.257  Not everyone
who is poor is violent, for example, but the level of violence in
poor areas is higher than in wealthy areas. Therefore, poverty is
associated with violence, although it cannot be said to "cause"
violence. Is this testable? Certainly-identify the null hypothesis
(that the factor is not statistically correlated with a particular
outcome-violence, in this case), define your terms, run your
numbers on a sufficiently large population enough times, and you
have tested your hypothesis. But what does it mean if you find a
statistically significant correlation?2 58
Statistical theory is based on the idea that there is an
underlying structure in large matrices of data.259 The problem with
this theory is that, although the mathematics are unimpeachable,
neither the fact that there is a correlation nor the strength of the
correlation says anything about the nature of the cause.26  For
example, as the number of my publications increases, the price of
diamonds has also increased, and so has the distance between the
Earth and Halley's Comet.26' There may be a strong positive
correlation among these factors.262 Are they causally related (even
255 Id.
256 Nancy C. Andreasen, Linking Mind and Brain in the Study of Mental illnesses: A
Project for a Scientific Psychopathology, 275 SCi. 1586, 1587 (1997) (discussing conceptual
issues in scientific psychopathology).
257 See Stephen F. Lanes, Error and Uncertainty in Causal Inference, in CAUSAL
INFERENCE 173, 182 (Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988). "The uncertainty in causal
inference is attributable to the fact that we cannot establish that an association is valid."
Id. at 185. An unidentifiable error may exist and it may cause the observation. See id.
The most that can be expected of strength of association and the level of statistical
significance is that they affect subjective beliefs.
258 Meaning, or rationality, is one of the facets of falsifiability. It is a way of comparing
ideas, and consists of openness to critique, testing the theory against other theories in
terms of coherence and empirical content and explanatory power. See Karl Popper,
Normal Science and its Dangers, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 51, 57
(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
159 See GOULD, supra note 99, at 268.
260 Id. at 273.
261 See id. at 272 (explaining that even the most dedicated astrologer would not discern
causality in most of these relationships).
262 As Webster explain with regard to correlations, "some findings may be very highly
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in a probabilistic sense)? Obviously not. The majority of
statistically correlated factors are merely coincidental. Thus, the
choice of factors for analysis implies some underlying causal
theory even if it is unstated (or undeveloped).263
Moreover, even if there is a causal relationship, correlations
can tell us little about the nature of the cause. 264  The positive
statistical correlation between poverty and violence does not show
anything about which one may be a cause of the other or what the
causal nature might be."' For example, if a propensity for violence
correlates with socioeconomic situation, is that because poverty
breeds despair, or because poverty causes poor childhood
nutrition, which affects the growing brain (and therefore
decisionmaking), or because there is a high level of lead paint
(linked to neural deficits) in poor neighborhoods? Or is it because
violent people have trouble relating to others and so they become
poor through an inability to hold a job? Or is the correlation due
to something else entirely? Thus, the question underlying the
choice of factors used in each of the instruments must be: Why this
factor and not others?2 66
Notably, none of the actuarial instruments claims a causal
connection, although the PCL-R comes close.2 67 Only the PCL-R
advances an express theory26 for why it chose any particular
statistically significant but... they may be extremely unimportant or uninteresting."
WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 n.11.
263 See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 379
(2d ed. 2001) (explaining that a labor economist might use labor market theory to select
certain types of experience and education as explanatory factors in a wage equation but
noting that this ideal is seldom met in practice, either because theory is not complete
enough to dictate the choices, or because data for theoretically perfect factors are not
available and surrogates must be used instead).
261 See GOULD, supra note 99, at 273.
265 See, e.g., Eric Silver et al., Assessing Violence Risk Among Discharged Psychiatric
Patients: Toward an Ecological Approach, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 237, 250 (1999)
(observing that "concentrated poverty in the neighborhoods where patients resided after
discharge was significantly related to the overall amount of violence they committed").
This correlation says nothing about cause. Similarly, just because war has been an
enduring fact of human history does not mean that violence is an innate trait of human
beings, rather, the potential for aggression may be an expression of some other underlying
biological principles that anticipate peaceful interactions in other environments. See
GOULD, supra note 99, at 360 (critiquing the assertions of E.O. Wilson that aggression is
innate in human beings). In other words, there is a wide range of human behaviors that
are different expressions of biological potentials in various environments. See id. at 360.
266 See Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical
Models in the Earth Sciences, 263 ScI. 641, 641 (1994) (using the example of numerical
simulation models in the earth sciences, and noting that "the observation and
measurement of both independent and dependent variables are laden with inferences and
assumptions").
267 See Hare, supra note 192, at 99 (claiming that "[p]sychopathy is the prime
crimogenic personality trait").
268 See id. at 100, 103 (claiming that psychopathy is a distinct type of personality
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factors.269  If the PCL-R is flawed in its reasoning, however, it
affects all three of the instruments, because both of the other
instruments use the PCL-R as one of their factors.
The underlying theory of any actuarial violence risk
instrument is that if you combine a critical number of risk factors,
each of which has been demonstrated to have a statistically
significant correlation with a recurrence of violent behavior, as
long as you choose the factors carefully (by controlling for inter-
relationships among the various factors-such as previous criminal
charges and prior convictions)27 you can predict the probability of
recurring violent conduct. The theory underlying the creation of
such an instrument is that patterns of behavior in populations can
predict the probability that an individual's behavior will fall within
that range. Is this assertion falsifiable? At least in theory it is,
although in practice (because of the large sample sizes needed and
the length of time necessary to assess recurrence) it may be
difficult. A more fundamental problem is whether prediction is
ever possible in biological systems.
exhibiting "a constellation of affective, interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics" and
that they "are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the serious crime in most
societies"). The problem with this assertion, among other things, is that not only violent
individuals share these traits, but so do those who do not break the law, together with
others whose crimes "run the gamut from petty theft and fraud to cold-blooded violence."
Id. at 103. Although Hare claims a base level of psychopathy at less than one percent of
the general population, he also claims that "they comprise a significant proportion of our
prison population." Id. at 104. Surprisingly, he further claims that "it is not uncommon
for psychopaths to emerge as leaders and 'patriots' as well as "high pressure salesmen
and stock promoters," "radical political activists," people "active in the business and
corporate world," "unethical lawyers and doctors" and a panoply of "serial killers and
rapists, drug dealers, pimps, spouse and child abusers, swindlers and con men," and just
about every other possible human occupation (except psychologists). Id. Wait a minute:
wasn't this instrument supposed to predict violence? Except for the "serial killers" and
"terrorists" in Hare's panoply, those described are not committing acts of physical
violence. So just what is being predicted? Nonetheless, Hare asserts that the PCL-R is a
"robust predictor of violence in criminals," and a number of researchers agree. See Dolan
& Doyle, supra note 157, at 305 (citing studies); see also WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at
12 (citing a study in which the PCL-R score "alone performed as well as, or better than,
the best combination of 16 other variables selected by multiple regression"). Despite the
accolades of a number of researchers, Hare's theory is highly questionable when examined
in light of Popper's criteria for falsifiabiliy. See Popper, supra note 258, at 57. One reason
for the success of the PCL-R may be its reliance on factors associated with childhood
aggression that may have a biological basis quite different from that asserted by Hare.
269 The VRAG factors, for example, were chosen because of their "well-established
empirical relationship with violent criminality." QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 143. The
authors of the instrument acknowledge that improvements to their instrument are possible
by including "physiological measures (e.g., serotonin levels) or situational variables (e.g.,
postdischarge social supports)" but that the research to show whether these variables
would improve the predictive accuracy of the VRAG has not been done. Id. at 176-77.
270 See id. at 146.
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2. Complexity Theory and the Problem of Prediction
Predictions in complex systems are always highly contingent,
and human behavior is an emblematic complex system. "A
complex adaptive system is a collection of individual agents with
freedom to act in ways that are not always totally predictable, and
whose actions are interconnected so that one agent's actions
changes the context for other agents." '271 The principles of
complexity theory have largely replaced deterministic notions of
causation in biology, and some aspects of physics as well.272
Complexity theory explains that we, as individuals, are interacting
parts of a complex world, we have numerous interactions with our
environment, and the instigator of our actions, the brain itself, is a
complex organ.273
Interactions of complex systems simply cannot be predicted
far in advance with any accuracy. We cannot predict the
occurrence of an idea or the behavior that results from it any more
than we can predict next week's weather.274 We can discern
regular patterns of weather which recur under particular
conditions, but the weather will change in unpredictable ways
when any of the underlying conditions change. 275 The problem is
two-fold: first, small errors in determining the initial conditions
(i.e., the predictors) may yield large errors in calculating expected
outcomes; and second, even when the properties of the individual
components are understood, the behavior of a system with many
271 Paul E. Plsek & Trisha Greenhalgh, The Challenge of Complexity in Health Care,
323 BRIT. J. MED. 625 (2001) (giving as examples the immune system, a colony of
termites, the financial market, and "just about any collection of humans").
272 See ILYA PRIGOGINE, THE END OF CERTAINTY: TIME, CHAOS AND THE NEW
LAWS OF NATURE 4-5 (1997) (explaining that while "[cilassical science emphasized order
and stability; now, in contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, and limited
predictability at all levels of observation.... [so that] we are now able to include
probabilities in the formulation of the basic laws of physics").
273 See Mark D. Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future Dangerousness: The
Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3 CRIM. JUSTICE 18, 45 (1989) (explaining that a
"person-focused" assessment.., is extremely inaccurate because people do not live in
vacuums" and research emphasizes "the importance of situational and environmental
influences on behavior").
274 We cannot predict the weather because it is a "classic case of chaotic behavior."
RICARD V. SOLE & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE: How COMPLEXITY PERVADES
BIOLOGY 3, 9 (2000). That is because "small errors in initial conditions give rise to very
large errors in calculating expected outcomes." Id. at 12.
275 Complexity theory, the study of nonlinear systems (like the weather), involves both
the study of chaos, with sensitivity to initial conditions that makes dynamics unpredictable,
and emergent properties, in which observers are generally unable to predict the behavior
of nonlinear systems from their parts and interactions. See id. at 20.
2003] 1885
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
interacting components is inherently unpredictable.276
Complexity theory explains the notorious difficulty of
predicting violent storms.277  As one judge noted, "A weather
forecast is a classic example of a prediction of indeterminate
reliability, and a place peculiarly open to debatable decisions ....
Weather predictions fail on frequent occasions." '278 Why should
this be so? The weather is a classic case of chaotic behavior
(where small errors in measurement of initial conditions give rise
to grossly inaccurate predictions) and emergent phenomena
(where many components interact).279 Weather is due to "the
behavior of the gases that make up the earth's atmosphere under
the influence of the rotation of the earth and the sun's radiant
energy."2 80 Although the atmosphere obeys the equations of fluid
dynamics and should therefore be determinable, it also is governed
by the nonlinear dynamics of the Lorenz attractor, a mathematical
description of the trajectories of motion of atmospheric flow in
three dimensions. 81 As a result, the weather patterns display both
order and chaos. What this means in terms of predictability is that
weather predictions are fairly accurate for the next day, but fall off
rapidly for three-day forecasts, and become highly chaotic after six
days.2 82
The importance of measuring relevant information is stressed
in complexity theory. In weather prediction, for example, "over
10,000 land-based stations and hundreds of ships collect weather
information daily at six-hour intervals. ' 283  Feedback about
predictions is crucial. In addition to the weather stations, there are
satellites, balloons, ,aircraft, and human spotters making daily
observations, and funneling them to one of several meteorological
centers 1 These centers generate regional reports, which are then
adapted to local conditions.285 A huge amount of information is
generated and analyzed at frequent intervals, something unlikely
to be achieved in human behavior.
276 See id. at 13.
277 Although the assertion is made that weather forecasters are "exemplary risk
assessors," the error rate is actually quite high, particularly over the long-term and for rare
and severe weather events, and especially when the amount of data used is taken into
consideration. See Monahan & Steadman, supra note 239, at 931.
278 Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199, 204 (1st Cir. 1986).
279 See SOLE & GOODWIN, supra note 274, at 9.
280 Id.
281 See id. at 10.
m See R. Kerr, Official Forecasts Pushed Out to a Year Ahead, 266 Sci. 1940, 1940
(1994) (stating that weather predictions are "swamped by chaos beyond six days or so").
283 Monahan & Steadman, supra note 239, at 933.
284 See id.
285 See id.
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This illustrates an important failing of the actuarial future
dangerousness instruments. None of the actuarial instruments
incorporates any of the biological information about violence.
Given what we know about the importance of measuring initial
conditions in complexity theory, this is a huge gap. All the
available actuarial instruments, even the best, would be more
predictive if they also assessed biological information about the
brain.286 Those factors would include "physiological measures and
assessments of neurocognitive function and how individuals
process emotional information. ' '1 7
Moreover, even using all available data, there are limits to
prediction."' There are three reasons for these limits. First, the
human brain is the premier example of nonlinearity: that is, there
is no predictable relationship between cause and effect. The brain
itself is composed of multiple interacting and self-regulating
physiological systems including biochemical and neuroendocrine
feedback loops, which influence human behavior partly through an
internal set of responses and partly through adaptive responses to
new stimuli from the environment, forming a web of interacting
systems that are dynamic and fluid.8 9 Second, an individual's
conduct results from both internal stimuli and environmental
stimuli, including a web of relationships affecting beliefs,
286 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 309 (urging incorporation of biological
factors into actuarial instruments).
287 Id.
2 See Robinson, supra note 142, at 1450.
289 See SOLE & GOODWIN, supra note 274, at 1. As an article in a noted scientific
journal explained:
* The human body is composed of multiple interacting and self regulating
physiological systems including biochemical and neuroendocrine feedback
loops.
* The behaviour of any individual is determined partly by an internal set of
rules based on past experience and partly by unique and adaptive responses
to new stimuli from the environment.
" The web of relationships in which individuals exist contains many varied
and powerful determinants of their beliefs, expectations, and behaviour.
• Individuals and their immediate social relationships are further embedded
within wider social, political, and cultural systems which can influence
outcomes in entirely novel and unpredictable ways.
" All these interacting systems are dynamic and fluid.
* A small change in one part of this web of interacting systems may lead to a
much larger change in another part through amplification effects.
For all these reasons neither illness nor human behaviour is predictable and
neither can safely be "modelled" in a simple cause and effect system. The
human body is not a machine and its malfunctioning cannot be adequately
analysed by breaking the system down into its component parts and considering
each in isolation.
Tim Wilson & Tim Holt, Complexity and Clinical Care, 323 BRIT. J. MED. 685 (2001).
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expectations, and behavior.290  Third, individuals and their
immediate social relationships are further embedded within wider
social, political, and cultural systems that are continuously
interacting; nature, nurture, and notions of free will all interact in a
way that can only be considered probabilistic. The equilibrium of
each of these systems can be radically altered by seemingly
inconsequential stimuli.
Thus, no matter how accurate the instrument, it will be
impossible to predict a particular individual's behavior.91 The
most that can be said is a probabilistic statement for the group
within which the individual fits. Why, then, would anyone propose
that actuarial instruments be used for predicting violence? If the
best that can be achieved is the contingent reliability of weather
predictions, is that reliable enough to sentence someone to death?
The best that can be said is that actuarial instruments may improve
on the woeful inadequacy of clinical predictions.2 92
B. What Data Supports or Undermines the Theory?
The VRAG, the PCL-R, and the HC-20 have all been
published and peer-reviewed in the psychological and criminology
communities, thus satisfying the Daubert prongs of peer review
and publication. They have been, overall, well-received, thus
meeting general acceptance. But the important question in each
case is whether the theory has factual support, or whether there is
data that significantly undermines it. 93
1. Choice of Variables
The VRAG study considered a large number of variables that
had been shown by other researchers to have a demonstrated
correlation with violence, and performed separate stepwise
290 See generally DAMASIO, supra note 117 (discussing the neural underpinnings of
reason, emotion, and the complex, interactive systems of the brain, which in turn interact
with systems in the rest of the body, the environment, other individuals, and culture).
291 See Plsek & Greenhalgh, supra note 271, at 625.
292 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 20 (noting that courts and legislatures
continue to demand these predictions, although "three decades of research has failed to
produce an accurate scheme for predicting violence" and outlining a "scheme for
prediction which we hope will offer better accuracy").
293 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 178, at 1595 (urging an interdisciplinary analysis that
examines all the available information in light of three questions: "What range of facts
deserves investigation? What is the proper way to investigate them? And what do the
results of the investigation mean?").
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discriminant analyses in order to identify variables in various
categories that had the greatest predictive power. These
categories included childhood history, adult adjustment, and the
circumstances of the initial violent offense.295 From these stepwise
regressions, the researchers chose twelve variables.296 When
combined, these twelve variables yielded an overall correlation
(weighted to take into account the relative importance of each) of
0.45.297 This is not a high degree of correlation, but it represents an
improvement over most previous actuarial violence predictions,
the best of which managed a correlation of 0.40.298 If the most
strongly correlated variables-the PCL-R score, elementary school
maladjustment, and DSM III diagnosis of personality disorder-
were omitted from the instrument, the overall correlation of the
VRAG fell to 0.36, showing that the remaining variables
demonstrate some, though less, predictive power.299  These low
(though better than prior instruments') correlations indicate that
these instruments all have considerable unexplained variance."
Although the VRAG includes the PCL-R, the authors also
critique it. They found that the correlation between violent
recidivism and the PCL-R alone is only .33, and that adding the
other eleven VRAG variables increased the correlation to .45.3°
They contend that "the entire PCL-R can be replaced by variables
pertaining only to antisocial childhood behavior imply[ing] that
PCL-R factor 1 items reflecting apparently adult personality (e.g.,
glibness, grandiosity, lying, conning, remorselessness, shallowness,
callousness) do little or nothing to reduce uncertainty about the
likelihood of violent recidivism. 32 Thus, the link is much stronger
between childhood aggression and adult violence than between
any of the so-called personality traits. Moreover, the VRAG
authors criticized PCL-R's reliance on clinical judgment, so they
replaced clinical assessment of the PCL-R with factors that could
be obtained from the subject's history.
294 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
295 See id.
296 See id.
297 A perfect correlation would be 1.0. SPATZ, supra note 91, at 80.
298 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 36-37. As a point of comparison, LSAT scores,
which are considered to be predictive enough of law school performance to base
admission on them, have a correlation coefficient of about 0.60. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN,
supra note 263, at 30.
299 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 36-37.
300 See Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at 486 (noting that this may be due to
"inadequacies in conceptualization and, of equal importance, instrumentation").
301 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 163 (noting that the increase under the ROC
method was from .65 to .75).
3 Id. at 168.
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2. Inter-rater consistency
The consistency with which different people assess the risk of
violence in a particular person is an important consideration,
especially in litigation. Although the VRAG has been carefully
structured in an attempt to minimize cognitive biases, all of the
actuarial instruments require human input and at least a degree of
subjective decisionmaking. Some degree of variability in scoring
can therefore be expected among different raters. The VRAG
inter-rater agreement in scoring was found to be 0.90, showing a
high degree of correlation."3 The PCL-R inter-rater agreements
"typically exceed 0.80. ' " Inter-rater reliability is a concern,
because if two raters disagree about a prediction, at least one of
them will be wrong."' Inter-rater agreement however, is no
guarantee of validity; when all raters agree, the instrument may
still be invalid-the raters could all be wrong. °"
3. Measuring Predictive Accuracy
The preferred method for evaluating the prediction accuracy
of each of the instruments discussed is the statistical analysis
known as receiver operator characteristics (RO). 307  This is also
the type of statistical analysis preferred for comparing instruments
to each other.30  In this type of analysis, sensitivity 09 and
specificity10 are taken into effect to yield an area under the
303 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 41 n.4. Correlations can be either positive (+) or
negative (-); for ease of reference, the correlations referred to in this Article are positive
unless otherwise noted.
304 Hare, supra note 192, at 101.
305 See Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case
Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 921 (2000) (noting that "validity is suspect" when
two raters fail to agree).
306 See id.
307 For a discussion of the use of ROC analysis in predicting violence in involuntary
hospitalization proceedings, see Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay
on the Mathematics of Clinical Violence Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 115 (1995) (explaining that "the relative performance of
diagnostic tests can be evaluated using ROC graphs").
3 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 304.
3 Sensitivity in the violence prediction instruments is the rate of violent outcomes
when risk had been predicted. See id. at 309.
310 For the violence prediction instruments, this would be the rate of nonviolent
outcomes when no risk had been predicted. See id. Notably, there are trade-offs in
sensitivity and specificity, and ROC analysis provides a method for assessing accuracy
independent of biases favoring sensitivity or specificity and also distinct from the
prevalence of violence. See Mossman, supra note 307, at 126 (describing ROC method to
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measured curve of scale scores."' A random prediction (chance)
would yield an ROC value of 0.5; ROC values range from 0-1, with
1 representing nearly perfect accuracy.31 2  An ROC of .75 is
considered to be a large effect size.3"3
To measure the accuracy of the VRAG, the authors used a
statistical analysis known as the Relative Operating Characteristic
(RO). 314 This method of analysis was chosen because of the low
base rate in the populations studied.315 A test that is no better than
chance would have an ROC of .50; the VRAG ROC was .76,
which means that "if an offender were drawn randomly from each
of the recidivist and nonrecidivist groups, there was a probability
of .76 that the recidivcist had the higher score on the VRAG. 316
This is a statistically significant result, comparable to ROC scores
for predictions in meteorology and medical imaging. 17 Studies on
the PCL-R have shown an ROC value of approximately .72.318 A
study of post-release violent offenders comparing the VRAG with
the PCL-R and the HCR-20 showed an ROC value of .596, .618,
and .562, respectively, for subsequent violent convictions over a
mean release time of 790 days, but found no statistically significant
difference among the instruments.3 19  Note that with chance
defined as an ROC of .50, none of these instruments is fabulously
predictive.
C. What Assumptions are Used to Fill the Gaps and Are They
Supportable ?3 21
Probabilistic assessments inevitably employ assumptions,32'
predict accuracy).
311 See id. at 304-05 (describing the statistical analysis).
312 See id. at 304.
313 See id. at 305.
314 See Binderman, supra note 229, at 29.
315 See id.
316 QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 148.
317 See Binderman, supra note 229, at 29.
318 See Dolan & Doyle, supra note 157, at 305 (citing GRANN, supra note 218).
319 Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at 479, 483. These same analysts found ROC values
for "major misconduct"-defined as inciting a riot, drug/alcohol use; refusing urinalysis;
assaults; and refusing a direct order-of .575 for the PCL-R; .565 for the HCR-20; and .627
for the VRAG. Id. at 482, tbl. 3. These outcomes however, are qualitatively different
from the kind of violence that concerns death penalty juries.
320 The inquiry into supportable assumptions corresponds to some degree to Daubert's
General Acceptance factor, in that assumptions that are not commonly held will be
controversial.
321 All knowledge is incomplete; one simply cannot calculate "the probability that a
theory is true." Stephen F. Lanes, The Logic of Causal Inference, in CAUSAL INFERENCE
64-65 (Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988). As a result, assumptions to fill the gaps in
2003] 1891
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
and the actuarial instruments used in predicting dangerousness are
no different in this respect. Whether these assumptions are
supportable depends in large part on consensus among the
scientific community and the empirical basis for them.3 22 As the
authors of the VRAG acknowledge, the more assumptions that
are made about the data, the less predictive the resulting
instrument.323
One major assumption of all the instruments is that the
population that was the subject of the underlying studies can be
generalized to the people on whom the instrument will be used to
predict future dangerousness. Each of the instruments was
developed based on studies of men incarcerated in psychiatric
hospitals or prisons. That does not seem too great a stretch,
because the patients studied had all been admitted for crimes of
violence, a population similar to convicted defendants facing
sentencing proceedings.
The necessary assumptions for regression analysis include the
assumption that the model has been correctly specified; that any
measurement errors are random and independent; that
measurement errors are independent of the corresponding
observations for each of the model's explanatory variables; and
that no explanatory variable is perfectly correlated with a
combination of other variables.324 Moreover, the assumption of
non-linearity and interactive models (as discussed above in the
complexity section) would improve accuracy.325 Other methods,
such as neural networks and entropy minimax, have been used to
discover predictive relationships.26
knowledge are inevitable. Beecher-Monas, supra note 178, at 1583.
322 See IRME LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
PROGRAMMES 49 (1978).
323 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 146.
324 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 181,213 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000).
325 But see QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 146 (arguing that these improvements would
make little difference, given the possibility of measurement error and the level of accuracy
already achieved). An example of nonlinearity is the correlation of arousal and
performance where, although there is a strong correlation between performance and
arousal, the relationship is a curved line (nonlinear), showing low performance at both
high and low arousal and optimal performance in the mid-range. See SPATZ, supra note
91, at 96 (graphing the relationship between arousal and efficiency of performance). A
linear relationship between cause and effect can be demonstrated by turning the dimmer
switch on a light; the illumination varies in direct proportion to the amount the dimmer
switch is turned. See SOLE & GOODWIN, supra note 274, at 1-2.
326 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 146, 168 (citing studies and acknowledging that other
kinds of studies might be an improvement, but arguing that the VRAG's accuracy rivals
that for predicting violent storms).
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D. Methodology
The hypothesis underlying the VRAG was tested through a
retrospective study of a population of 618 released offenders over
a period of seven years.- The effect of each factor on overall risk
was scored, and the percentage of people who had re-offended
after the release was correlated with the score.3 28 The higher the
score, the more violence was committed by that particular group.
The VRAG study used a large sample (618 people),
permitting a statistical analysis. Its definitions of violent conduct
appear to be the kinds of behavior capital jurors might worry
about: killing, attempted killing, kidnapping, forcible confinement,
wounding, assault causing bodily harm, pointing a firearm, rape,
and sexual assaults involving robbery. This definition probably
corresponds to the types of behaviors a jury would be concerned
about in deciding the issue of future dangerousness.
In constructing the VRAG, variables were selected on the
basis of having a significant correlation with recurring violence.329
If any variables were highly correlated with each other, the one
with the lowest correlation with recurring violence was dropped.330
Least-squares stepwise multiple regression analysis was employed
"to select variables that added independently to the prediction of
violent recidivism. 33'
The particular statistical tool used by the actuarial
instruments is multiple regression, a method for probing the
relationship of two or more variables. 32 Multiple regression takes
a variable that must be explained (recurring violence, in this
instance) and examines its association with other variables such as
327 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 30.
328 This was the testing methodology that was used to construct the VRAG. See
QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 141-51.
329 See id. at 145.
330 See id. at 146.
331 Id. Two events, A and B, are independent when P(A/B) = P(A). As Suppes
explains, "the concept of independence is one of the most profound and fundamental
ideas, not only of probability theory but of science in general." PATRICK SUPPES, A
PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY 8 (1970). The concept of independence asserts
that discrete biological or physical events, like coin tosses, have no memory of time and
place. See Lynn A. Steen, The Science of Patterns, 240 SC. 611 (1988). In other words,
knowing whether a coin toss yielded heads or tails last time will not help predict what the
next coin toss will yield. See FREDERICK MOSTELLER ET AL., PROBABILITY WITH
STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS 8 (2d ed. 1970).
Independence is when "two variables are not correlated with each other in the
population." Rubinfeld, supra note 324, at 179.
332 See id. at 181.
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poverty.333 Multiple regression is a way of relating one variable to
the values of other explanatory variables in order to predict the
value of one variable using the values of others.334 It is frequently
employed in antitrust litigation, anti-discrimination class actions,
and market manipulation cases."
Least-squares regression was the method used in constructing
the VRAG. Least-squares is a well-regarded technique for
estimating the underlying parameters.336 Least-squares is a method
of reducing error when making predictions from a linear
relationship.337
To construct the VRAG, separate regression analyses were
run on different sets of variables, for example, childhood history,
adult adjustment, the characteristics of the original offense, and
the results of various tests (such as the PCL-R and IQ tests).338
The resulting variables selected in a majority of subgroups then
underwent a final regression analysis.339 The researchers selected
twelve variables for the instrument based on the results of the
regression analysis, and each was weighted with reference to the
overall base rate in the population, and given a score.3 40  The
333 See id. (explaining that multiple regression "involves a variable to be explained-
called the dependent variable-and additional explanatory variables that are thought to
produce or be associated with changes in the dependent variable").
334 See id. at 205-06.
335 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 263, at 350 (giving examples of regression
models in law).
336 See Rubinfeld, supra note 324, at 213, 223 (noting that the desirable properties of the
least-squares technique include unbiased estimators-so that if the regression were
calculated with different samples, the average of the estimates for each coefficient would
be the true parameters; consistent estimators-so that if the sample were very large, the
estimates would come close to the true parameters; and efficiency, in that the least-squares
estimators have the smallest variance among all linear unbiased estimators). "Least-
squares minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the actual values of the
dependent variable and the values prdiced by the regression equation." Id. at 224.
337 See SPATZ, supra note 91, at 101-02 (explaining that when you have many data
points that vary in relationship to each other, drawing a line that best represents the data
depends on which points are chosen for the equation, and that least-squares is a method to
minimize error in drawing a regression line, so that it best fits the data scores when the
scores vary together).
338 See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 146.
339 See id.
340 See id. at 147. Each of the twelve variables was assigned a weight of +1 or -1 for
every + or - 5% difference from the violence recidivism base rate of 31%. See WEBSTER
ET AL., supra note 1, at 33 (using the example of the "ever married" factor, where the
recidivism rate for subjects who had ever been married was 21%, yielding a 10%
difference from the mean recidivism rate of 31%, giving a weight of -2; and comparing this
with the "never married" recidivism rate of 38%, which-yielding a 5% increase over the
31% base rate -was given a score of +1). The highest weight was given to the PCL-R
score because, of all the variables, it had the strongest correlation with recurring violence.
See id. Scores ranged from -28 to +33. See QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 147. The mean
VRAG score for the population tested was close to zero, with a standard deviation of 12.9.
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distribution of offenders scores was a normal curve.341 This means
that roughly as many people fell within the lowest possible risk
category (where the probability of recurring violence was close to
0) as fell into the highest risk category (where the probability of
recidivism was close to 1.0).342
E. Assessing the Link Between Data and Hypothesis:
Helpfulness to the Jury (Relevance and Fit)
Repeated studies of actuarial methods have demonstrated
them to be superior to clinical judgment standing alone.3 43 Even
such instruments however, with their structured reasoning
requirements, do not obviate all the problems of human judgment.
For example, the risk factor descriptions may be vague, decreasing
their reliability.344 Sometimes the factors are not independent, for
example anger and the inability to sustain relationships.345
Moreover, the time period that the risk assessment is to cover, the
circumstances under which it will be implemented (prison for life
in the case of capital sentencing, and the perhaps eventual release
into the community after serving a minimum term of the life
sentence3 46), and the individual's motivation to refrain from
violence (including motivation to comply with treatment) must all
be taken into consideration in assessing risk.347 Yet rarely are they
addressed, either in court or in the actuarial instruments. A major
problem with each of the risk instruments is its failure to correlate
Id. The standard deviation is the amount that the typical measurement differs from the
average. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000) (noting
that "Deviations from the average that exceed three or four SDs are extremely unusual").
This high standard deviation remains unexplained. See Kroner & Mills, supra note 191, at
486 (noting that this may be due to "inadequacies in conceptualization and, of equal
importance, instrumentation").
341 See id. at 148. A normal curve, or bell-shaped distribution, means that 95% of the
distribution lies within two standard deviations of the mean. Rubinfeld, supra note 324, at
224. The standard deviation indicates how far two particular data points deviate from the
mean. See, e.g., STATISTICS AND THE LAW 409 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986)
(explaining the importance of statistics to scientific data, using the example of
environmental data).
342 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34.
343 See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 89, at 28 (citing studies).
34 See Carson, supra note 153, at 258 (noting the problem of reliability). For example,
even trained clinicians may differ on what exactly is meant by "glibness" (a factor on the
PCL-R) or "lack of insight" (a factor on the VRAG and HCR-20).
345 See id.
346 If permitted by statute; in some states, life term is without parole.
347 See id. at 261.
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the risk factors with neuroscience and evolutionary biology.34 s
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that risk is a social
construct. Although it uses probabilistic analysis and
quantification, it is not an exact science.34 9 Indeed, all science is
value-laden, and risk assessment is not different in that regard.35°
Using structured analysis however, offers many advantages in
human decisionmaking, particularly in light of the difficulty people
have in synthesizing differently-weighted likelihoods of varying
significance (such as risk factors for violent behavior).35' Thus,
actuarial instruments may offer a distinct advantage in assessing
risk of violent behavior.352
On the other hand, rare events-and recurring violence is
statistically rare, even among violent offenders-are inherently
difficult to predict.53 The most that can be said for any actuarial
risk assessment instrument is that it can give a probabilistic
estimate of the level of risk for people that share characteristics
with the person who is being assessed.' And the estimate is
subject to a great deal of error.355 The major problem for each of
the actuarial instruments is that the ultimate question of whether a
particular individual ought to be sentenced to death or to life in
prison cannot be answered through a risk appraisal. 56 Rather it is
a political question. The relative costs of imprisoning a person
that may ultimately prove to be violent despite a mistaken
prediction of nonviolence versus sentencing to death a person who
was mistakenly predicted to be violent can only be assessed in
348 See Don Grubin, Actuarial and Clinical Assessment of Risk in Sex Offenders, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 331, 342 (1999) (explaining that actuarial instruments do not,
but ought to, consider "the hardwiring of the brain that could be either genetic in origin or
the result of brain injury" as well as experiences "hindering the formation of attachment
bonds and the normal development of empathy"). But see Harris et al., supra note 130, at
197 (attempting to correlate the PCL-R with neuroscience and conceding that much
research still needs to be done).
349 See ROYAL SOCIETY, RISK: ANALYSIS, PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT 7 (1992)
(explaining that some subjectivity is always a part of risk assessment).
350 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 178, at 1563.
351 See J. RICHARD EISER & JOOP VAN DER PLIGT, ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS 100
(1988) (observing that human decision "accuracy declines considerably when the number
of features or the number of alternatives increases .... [and] reliability with which choice
rules are used tends to decrease as the decision-maker's information load increases").
352 See N. Morris & M. Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1-50 (M. Tonry & M. Miller eds., 1985).
353 WEBSTER ET AL, supra note 1, at 5.
354 See id. at 33 (discussing probabilistic estimates of dangerousness).
355 As the VRAG authors explain, "there is a predictive 'sound barrier"' of some
unknown dimension. Although they assert it is greater than 40% accuracy, they do not
have the data to substantiate the assertion. QUINSEY, supra note 2, at 168.
356 See id. at 1.52-53 (explaining that the question about how to apply the information
gleaned from an actuarial instrument is a matter of policy and depends on the relative
costs of false positives and false negatives).
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terms of values outside the instrument itself.
Paradoxically, although none of the actuarial instruments for
predicting risk of recurring violence is highly accurate (especially
over the long periods of time that capital juries are concerned
about), that is precisely why they should be admissible (and why it
could be ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney
not to use such expert testimony357). Rather than lumping all
convicted defendants into a yes or no dichotomy for future
violence, actuarial instruments permit a more sophisticated
analysis of the risk.
V. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: WHY ACTUARIAL INSTRUMENTS
MAY ASSIST THE JURY
Future dangerousness testimony is the major means of
persuading the sentencing jury that a convicted defendant poses a
threat to society and thus merits the death penalty.358  Despite
problems with the accuracy of violence predictions, there is some
argument that because actuarial predictions provide the best
information available, they should be admitted to help guide
decisionmakers in their determinations.359 The most hotly debated
topic in juror sentencing deliberations-next to the crime itself-is
the issue of the defendant's dangerousness upon return to
society.3" Future dangerousness takes precedence in jury
deliberations over any mitigating evidence, such as remorse,
mental illness, intelligence, or drug/alcohol addiction, and any
concern about the defendant's behavior in prison.36' In fact,
dangerousness determinations are part of the explicitly authorized
grounds for imposing death in a number of states and are required
in Texas and Oregon.362 But whether or not future dangerousness
is permitted or required by statute, and whether or not it is even
357 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (failure to present substantial
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial was ineffective
assistance).
358 See Albertson, supra note 273, at 20.
359 The American Bar Association, for example, notes that even though future
dangerousness testimony is highly subjective, courts are reluctant to exclude such evidence
because it is the "best information available." PARRY, supra note 165, at 49.
360 See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue",
86 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 398 (2001) (observing, on the basis of interviews with over a
hundred capital jurors, that "future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors,
and is thus "at issue" in virtually all capital trials, no matter what the prosecution says or
does not say").
361 See id. at 404 (noting results of capital juror interviews).
362 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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mentioned by prosecutors or presented as evidence in the penalty
phase of the case, it remains the major focus of the factfinders.363
This is true regardless of the presence or absence of expert
testimony about future dangerousness in the hearing.3"
Jurors often believe-incorrectly-that the law requires a
death sentence upon a showing of the defendant's future
dangerousness. Most people do not believe that defendants
sentenced to life will actually be required to spend the rest of their
lives in prison.366 They fear that a dangerous person will be
released into the community; that is a highly motivating factor in
choosing between death and a life sentence.3 6
7
There are a number of factors about jury deliberations that
increase the likelihood that jurors will overestimate the threat of
future violence. The most important of these is a lack of objective
information about such predictions.3 6  Base rate errors plague
human decisionmaking in general, so there is no reason to suppose
capital jurors are any different. Moreover, jurors are seldom
informed of the true rate of violent recidivism among murderers
released from prison.369 Interviews with capital jurors revealed that
3 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1560 (1998) (citing studies emphasizing the
"pervasive role future dangerousness testimony plays in and on the minds of capital
sentencing jurors").
364 See Blume et al., supra note 360, at 404 (reporting that "even in cases in which the
prosecution's evidence and argument at the penalty phase did 'not at all' emphasize the
defendant's future dangerousness, jurors who believed the defendant would be released in
under twenty years if not sentenced to death were still more likely to cast their final vote
for death than were jurors who thought the alternative to death was twenty years or
more"). Indeed, it was the explicit recognition of the importance the jury gives to future
dangerousness that motivated the Supreme Court to rule that defendants have a
constitutional ight to be informed of a death penalty alternative if the prosecution alleged
future danger as an aggravating circumstance and the alternative is life in prison without
parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); see also Kelley v. South
Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (reiterating the Court's earlier holding in Simmons); cf.
Garvey, supra note 363, at 1560 (observing that future dangerousness "appears to be one
of the primary determinants of capital-sentencing outcomes").
3 See James Liginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1174 (1995) (43% of surveyed jurors believed
the law required a death sentence upon a showing of future dangerousness).
366 See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 159 (citing South Carolina survey showing that 92.9% of
all jury-eligible adults surveyed believed that a life sentence meant the defendant would
be out of prison within 30 years).
367 See, e.g., id. at 159 (noting survey in which 75% of those surveyed said that the
amount of time actually spent in prison was either "extremely" or "very important" in
choosing between life and death).
368 See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 29, at 1.254 (noting that lack of objective
information about future dangerousness predictions is one of the prime reasons jurors
overestimate the defendant's threat of future violence).
369 See id. at 1254-55 (noting studies showing that jurors are unaware of the base rates
of violent recidivism among murderers).
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jurors who sentenced the defendant to death had median estimates
of future violence of eighty-five percent, with a fifty percent
median estimate that the defendant would commit another
murder.370 Yet, empirical studies demonstrate a counter-intuitive
decreased base rate for violence among capital commutees in
prison.71 In one study of 188 death-sentenced prisoners whose
sentences were commuted after Furman, for example, over the
more than five years after their release, only one killed again, and
only six committed violent offenses. 72  In studies of capital
commutees paroled into the community, twenty percent returned
to prison, but only eight to ten percent committed new felonies. 73
Unless jurors are informed about population base rates and how
they should use them in making their decision, risk estimates
amount to little more than speculation.74
In addition, jurors consistently underestimate the number of
years that must be served for a term of "life in prison," which
means that the prisoner will be much older and have less
opportunity in terms of potential risk period than jurors believe.
The decrease in violence and criminal activity with age is a well-
established principle of criminology.375 Base rates of violence are
far lower after the age of sixty (when most life prisoners would be
eligible for parole) than in the twenties.376
Thus, there is ample reason to believe that probabilistic
estimates would be helpful to the jury. Violence risk assessment is
not a yes/no dichotomy. Rather, it necessitates acknowledging
that risk estimates are less than certain and that the base rate of
serious violence among capital offenders is quite low. Nor is it
enough for experts to use the words "probability" or "risk" in their
testimony. In order to be helpful, the expert needs to educate the
jury in a scientifically sound manner, and this includes explicitly
stating the statistical basis for the opinion?77
Because of the centrality of the dangerousness determination
to juror deliberations, it would be helpful to the jury to have
information relating to it. It should however, be the best
370 See id. at 1269.
371 See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 89, at 23 (citing studies).
372 See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 29, at 1254-55.
373 See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 89, at 25 (citing studies and noting that there
are now longer minimum sentences that must be served before parole, making the
defendants in the studies much younger than current defendants will be when eligible for
parole).
374 See id. at 23.
375 See id. at 31.
376 See id. (citing studies).
377 See id. at 36-38 (advocating that experts limit their testimony to predominantly
statistical analyses in order to avoid going beyond the limits of their scientific expertise).
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information available. Currently, actuarial instruments offer the
most accurate way of making such predictions, but care must be
taken that the expert carefully explain the limits of such
testimony.378
It is important that juries be informed that even the most
accurate of the actuarial instruments made predictions of
dangerousness for people that did not, in fact, later commit acts of
violence. Of people who were placed in the "high risk" category
under the VRAG, for example, only fifty-five percent actually
committed violent acts upon release. That means forty-five
percent did not. Had the "high risk" prediction been the basis for
a death sentence, nearly half the people sentenced to death would
not, in fact, go on to commit any more acts of violence. More
importantly, a major failure of each of the actuarial instruments is
its failure to take into account what is being learned from
neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and enculturation.
CONCLUSION
The very least that ought to be expected of expert evidence
adduced at capital sentencing is a demonstration that it is
scientifically valid. The rule of law, with its goal of rational truth-
seeking, demands no less. Daubert's scientific validity requirement
is predicated on due process relevance and reliability fairness
concerns despite its genesis under the rules of evidence. Expert
testimony at capital sentencing must be scientifically valid to meet
these concerns. This is a foundational requirement and clinical
predictions cannot rise to the mark. Actuarial testimony can
barely squeak through. Actuarial predictions unquestionably have
shortcomings. Predicting violence, like predicting the weather,
is-at best--subject to a large margin of error. 79 Nonetheless,
however much we gripe about the accuracy of weather forecasts,
we frequently find them useful. Some of us-like the fishermen in
The Perfect Storm380 -even make life and death decisions based on
these predictions. Most of us would prefer to base our weather-
related decisions on meteorologists' statistical analyses rather than
the Farmers' Almanac.38'
378 See, e.g., Monahan & Steadman, supra note 239, at 935-36 (weather) (explaining that
predictions of the risk of future violence should be modeled explicitly on weather
predictions, with all their qualifiers and uncertainties).
379 See Monahan, supra note 3, at 914.
380 Id.
-81 To meet Daubert standards, an expert must demonstrate scientific validity by a
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The more empirical support we can muster for our decisions,
the more accurate they are likely to be. Because juries are likely
to evaluate the future dangerousness of any criminal defendant,
particularly in a capital crime, they should be provided with the
most accurate information that can bear on such an assessment.
This includes actuarial risk factor studies, analysis of whether
those risk factors were present in the defendant's circumstances,
and, probabilistically speaking, what that means in terms of the
defendant's likelihood of future violence. If the defendant falls
within a group in which three percent of the members may commit
future violent acts, for example, the jurors are entitled to that
information. If the group to which the defendant falls has a fifty-
five chance of repeated violent conduct, they are entitled to that
information. In conjunction with this information, capital jurors
are entitled to hear how opposing experts assess the applicability
of the risk factors to the defendant. But if they get any of this
information, they should get all of it. That includes the limitations
of prediction. To tell only part of the story is wholly misleading
and unscientific. Expert testimony with its "imprimatur of
science" must fully disclose the limitations of its scientific opinion.
preponderance, a standard the Farmers' Almanac would be unlikely to meet.
Meteorologists however, whose predictions are based on repeated statistical studies of
weather patterns, ought to be permitted to testify, as long as they disclose their error rates
and limitations of their testimony.
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